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Despite occasional complaints, most citizens, in “Western” nations at least, 
seem to be minimally satisfied with their democracies. At the same time, 
while things could be much worse, they could also be significantly better. In 
many countries, for growing segments of the population, including those who 
vote regularly, democracy has become synonymous with broken promises 
and abandoned commitments. One refrain, commonly heard, is that politi-
cians are “all the same – liars and hypocrites.” Opposition parties trumpet 
“hope and change” but deliver little once in office and instead invent new 
“mandates” that have nothing to do with their campaign platforms. Some 
political marketers now unashamedly maintain that the truth no longer mat-
ters, that facts are no longer relevant. A politician, some image-makers claim, 
can be more successful by manipulating people’s emotions. As a result of 
such negative perceptions of politics, more voters are becoming apathetic, 
deciding to opt out. And disproportionately those voters are socially and/or 
economically marginalized; the government does not seem to show much 
empathy for their day-to-day concerns. For those who still bother to vote, 
the system is frustrating, and citizens frequently swing “erratically between 
Left and Right looking for the elusive promise of democracy” (Swift 2010, 
23). The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016 
turned these rumblings of dissent into a roar heard around the world.
The feeling of powerlessness experienced by “the people” in civic affairs 
is particularly glaring under a so-called majority government, where a single 
party, one that under “first past the post” electoral systems may have garnered 
less than 40 per cent of the vote, can rule for four or five years without fear of 
defeat or recall. Such governments are especially prone to act autocratically, 
yet citizens have few ways to make their voices heard, aside from waiting 
patiently until their next opportunity to vote.
Introduction
x Introduction
Another option is to take to the streets to protest. More than ever, democ-
racy is being “subjected to a groundswell of dissatisfaction from below” 
(Swift 2010, 22). A recent example of this is Idle No More, a grassroots 
movement founded in Canada in 2012 that encompasses “a broad conver-
sation calling for recognition of treaty rights, revitalization of indigenous 
cultures, and an end to legislation imposed without meaningful consultation” 
(Kinew 2012). Thousands of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples across 
the country, as well as their allies in the broader community, engaged in ral-
lies and protests, some of which included blocking roads and bridges. The 
birth of the movement coincided with a hunger strike by Theresa Spence, 
chief of Attawapiskat First Nation, which lasted forty-three days, a strike that 
focused the nation’s attention on the issues facing her people, but one that 
had also been taken in solidarity with Idle No More. Chief Spence ended her 
hunger strike after Prime Minister Stephen Harper agreed to a meeting with 
Indigenous leaders.
Given the nature of Idle No More, some wondered aloud whether its 
actions were democratic, including Patrick Brazeau, a Conservative sena-
tor and member of Kitigan Zibi Anishinabeg First Nation. He proposed that 
Chief Spence should “think twice” about her actions. He suggested that 
there was no need for a hunger strike, “especially in Canada, living in a 
democratic society where there’s a lot of processes and procedures in place 
for all  Canadians – of all creed, religion, race, and colour – to have their 
voices heard,” and that Chief Spence should instead have followed “proper 
parliamentary processes” (quoted in Smith 2012). Still, for many people, 
demonstrations like Spence’s – and many others could be highlighted – are a 
symptom of the fact that governments are not hearing their citizens’ concerns 
on matters of fundamental importance. And those same citizens have no for-
mal entry point to get their concerns onto the public agenda.
This book focuses on one way to strengthen our political system, to 
increase its legitimacy, by forcing governments to, in effect, listen to “the 
people.” It makes a case for the creation of permanent citizens’ assemblies 
(CAs). These assemblies would consist of groups of ordinary adults, an equal 
number of men and women, chosen at random from the population, from 
among those who are willing and able to participate. They would be charged 
with examining important public issues and recommending ways to address 
those issues.
Any such assembly would only advise governments; it would not have 
any legislative powers. If we proceed on this basis, permanent CAs could 
be established without having to amend any country’s constitution; in most 
nations, this would be a difficult and perhaps impossible task that after years 
of extensive wrangling would probably not succeed. Experience has shown 
that many people will opt for the status quo over what they perceive as a 
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“radical” change in how politics is conducted if they sense an abrupt recon-
figuration of familiar government institutions, institutions that in some cases 
are centuries old. This book, although rooted somewhat in the Canadian 
context, proposes a workable democratic reform that is achievable in a rela-
tively short space of time, one that could be implemented, with only slight 
modifications, in any of the world’s roughly 200 nations.
Chapter 1 begins with a brief summary of the basic structure of direct 
democracy in ancient Athens as well as a concise survey of the rise of rep-
resentative democracy. The chapter goes on to note the usual, and often 
unreliable, ways that governments seek information from the public, while 
highlighting a few examples of how temporary CAs have operated in prac-
tice in Canada, Australia, and Ireland. Chapter 2 draws out in detail how a 
citizen’s assembly might work: how its members could be selected; how it 
would set its agenda; the process of group deliberation; and how an elected 
legislature might handle its recommendations. In addition, it explains why a 
CA would need to maintain its independence from both politicians and politi-
cal parties.
While this book focuses on the idea of a national CA, chapter 3 suggests 
that governments at every level, including state/provincial and municipal, 
could effectively use CAs, as could all types of quasi-government organiza-
tions. Chapter 4 addresses some criticisms that such assemblies are likely 
to encounter, including the age-old idea that everyday people lack the intel-
ligence to provide sophisticated answers to complicated policy questions. 
Chapter 5 notes the potential cost of an assembly. It also examines the poten-
tial benefits via two brief case studies from Canada – the proposed Quebec 
“Charter of Values” and the federal government’s current and long-standing 
attempt to procure military aircraft. It then looks at two “costly” international 
case studies – the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” referendum on European 
Union membership in 2016, and the decision by the United States and the 
UK to go to war with Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the consequences of 
those decisions.
Chapter 6 suggests that, even with a CA, the decision-making institutions 
of states would continue to operate exactly as they do now, including the leg-
islature, the executive (cabinet), the courts, the civil service, the police, and 
the military. However, I also advance the possibility that, in a series of steps 
taken over a couple of decades, a CA could, in the Canadian case, replace 
the Senate as a chamber of “sober second thought.” The Conclusion encour-
ages everyone, regardless of where they place themselves on the ideological 
spectrum, to demonstrate confidence in their civic neighbours by giving them 





Democracy Ancient and Modern
Democracy was invented in ancient Athens, though it had little in common 
with the type of democracy most nations practice today. Much of this chap-
ter is taken up with this history, telling the story of how we moved over time 
from direct democracy to representative democracy. This is followed by a 
section which notes the difficulties that citizens in representative democra-
cies have in making themselves heard and, conversely, the challenges faced 
by governments in trying to determine the best ways to listen to “the people.” 
The chapter concludes by highlighting recent cases of one attempt to solve 
these problems, through the creation, in a few countries, of a number of tem-
porary citizens’ assemblies (CAs).
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN ANCIENT ATHENS
In ancient Greece from about 750 to 500 BC, roughly 1,000 poleis (“city-
states”) emerged as the dominant form of governance, though for most of 
them we know almost nothing.1 We are aware that some of them were oligar-
chies (“rule by the few”) or were run by tyrants, men who had seized power, 
usually attempting to create a dynasty whereby that power would be passed 
on to one of their sons. At various points, many other poleis became democra-
cies, though none more famous, and none more well documented, than “Ath-
ens” (often used as a shorthand way of referring to the city-state of Attica, 
which consisted of about 2,500 square kilometres and included Athens, its 
only city). By 350 BC, the population of Attica was about 300,000. Only 
30,000 residents were citizens, however; this low number relative to overall 
population was because women, slaves, and foreigners (metics), with rare 
exceptions, could not gain citizenship. There had been about 60,000 citizens 
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in the mid-fifth century BC; the ensuing decline in numbers was a result of 
wars, plagues, and a law in 451 which restricted citizenship to children of 
Athenian fathers and mothers (so, no longer only fathers).
By the mid-fourth century, the word polis (the singular of “poleis”) was 
being used “in two senses: geographically to mean a ‘city’ and politically to 
mean a ‘state’,” a form of “self-governing community” (Hansen 1999, 56). 
Still, “polis” might be more accurately translated as “citizen-state” rather 
than “city-state” (Cartledge 2016, 15). This is especially the case because 
(1) only one-fifth of the residents of Attica lived in the urban centre; the rest 
were settled throughout the countryside, hence this “city-state” (and almost 
all others) was essentially rural; and (2) Athenian citizens were the state; for 
reasons which will be highlighted later in this chapter, they never experienced 
a substantial division between “we, the people” and “the government.”
After c.700 BC, Athens was ruled by a council of wealthy nobles, which 
at some point took the form of nine men appointed for annual terms. In the 
ensuing centuries, there was great conflict as a result of long-running feuds 
between some of the noble families and between those nobles and the impov-
erished masses who worked the land. As a result, in 594, Solon, an aristocrat, 
was appointed to try to settle these disputes. In the process, peasant-farmers, 
the hektemoroi, had their debts cancelled. They were then allowed to hold 
their lands rent free, which effectively made them owners of the properties 
they had been occupying for some time. In addition, political reforms brought 
many non-nobles into the work of governance. Solon created a Council; one 
of its main roles seems to have been to set the agenda for an assembly, which 
was open to all citizens. His most important development was a new court 
system, in which all citizens could serve as jurors. Justice was henceforth in 
the hands of everyday men, something unprecedented at this time, and argu-
ably something never replicated anywhere to the present day.
Solon’s reforms seem to have garnered broad acceptance from the major 
players in the disputes, though conflicts recurred. In 508/507, another aristo-
crat, Cleisthenes, was appointed to help restore order. He had strong support 
from the demos, the farmers and craftsmen who were the backbone of the 
economy. A long-term settlement was only going to take hold if these men 
could be accommodated by granting them substantial powers, so Cleisthenes, 
in effect, “undercut the hold which the nobles had earlier exercised over the 
political machinery of the state” (Stockton 1990, 24). He did so by making 
significant revisions to the three institutions whose creation is generally 
attributed to Solon. They were:
(1) The Assembly (Ekklesia): All citizens aged twenty and over could 
sit in the Assembly. By the mid-fourth century, it was meeting forty 
times a year, about once every nine days, with roughly 6,000 people in 
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attendance. Its agenda was posted in public four days prior to each meet-
ing. At an assembly, which usually took up an entire morning, there was 
no “discussion” or “deliberation” as we would understand it. In contrast, 
members, typically from the wealthier classes, those who had been for-
mally educated simply spoke for or against motions. All members, from 
the richest to the poorest, listened to the speeches of these rhetores, and 
then voted by show of hands. The responsibility of the men who sat in 
the Assembly consisted “of actively listening to and judging the merits 
of complex, competing arguments,” a role in which the ordinary citizen 
“was forced to think about and choose among the various policy options 
presented to him” (Ober 1989, 79). Most people assumed that these men 
had “enough common sense to choose wisely between the proposals on 
offer” (Hansen 1999, 306).
(2) The Council of 500 (Boule): It generated the agenda for the Assembly 
and implemented its laws and decrees, so, for instance, it oversaw the 
construction of public works which were mandated by the Assembly. Its 
members were chosen, in ten groups of fifty men each, from those who 
agreed to put their names forward, to represent the various geographic 
areas which comprised Attica. Most of the men on the Council likely 
came from the top half of the population, in terms of personal wealth. 
Each man was appointed to serve a term of one year; he could serve only 
two such terms in his lifetime, and those could not be served in consecu-
tive years. Given what we know of Athens’ population, the vast majority 
of citizens would have served on the Council at least once. The Council 
met daily, with a number of exceptions, such as festival days. A different 
chairman, who presided over meetings, was chosen by lot each morning, 
and, once chosen, he could not serve in that role again for the remain-
der of his annual term. The Council had no decision-making powers. It 
created motions for discussion, which the Assembly was free to accept 
without alterations, amend then accept, or reject.
(3) The Law Courts (Dikasteria): Every year, 6,000 men were chosen by lot, 
from those who had agreed to let their names stand, to serve as “dikasts.” 
During the year, for each day courts were in session, the requisite num-
ber of jury panels was selected, again by lot, from this group of 6,000. 
Dikasts were generally older, poorer, and perhaps unemployed men who 
were not active in farming and so had the time required to devote to the 
tasks at hand, which could occupy 200 days per year. Most cases prob-
ably employed 501 jurors, but jury panels could be much larger, if a case 
were deemed to be important. Courts spent a lot of their time dealing 
with lawsuits between private individuals and “public” suits, where a 
citizen could claim that another citizen had, in effect, committed a crime 
against the polis (or against “the people”). In court, each side spoke for 
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a set amount of time, and then jurors voted in secret. The time allotted 
for speakers was relatively brief for private suits, but for public suits 
(which were basically trials of people such as politicians and generals), 
the accuser and accused had about three hours each to make their cases.
In addition to these institutions, the Athenian state was run by about 600 
administrators (magistrates), who served annual terms, usually as part of 
boards consisting of ten people. Magistrates handled the minute details 
involved in implementing the decisions of the Assembly. Most of these men 
were chosen by lot from those who put their names forward (ho boulomenos, 
a volunteer, “any citizen who wishes”). They were charged with regulating 
markets, acting as auditors, overseeing the construction of public buildings, 
and running the religious and cultural festivals. Perhaps 100 or so of these 
magistrates were elected, in areas deemed to require specific expertise, 
including most financial officers as well as the ten generals who were in 
charge of the army and navy.
As noted, members of the Council, the dikasts ( jurors), and the vast major-
ity of magistrates were selected by lot. It was basically “luck of the draw” 
that determined which citizens would serve in each area of government. 
Athens used the lot because it prevented small groups of people, typically 
the wealthy, from monopolizing power (and quarrelling incessantly with 
each other in the process of doing so). The lot, combined with the novelty of 
having most magistrates, including the generals, work as part of a group with 
nine other colleagues, suggests that the motto of Athens could have been: 
“Never grant too much power to an individual.” The lot assumed that the 
vast majority of men were fair, honest, and just, and that they had roughly 
equal abilities. It also took for granted that they were capable of carrying 
out most state functions – such as chairing meetings, putting forth motions, 
organizing activities, keeping records, and collecting money – though there 
was an acknowledgement that a few specialized tasks should be carried out 
by individuals elected by the people.
The democracy at Athens was constantly evolving, creating and revising 
rules as well as institutions. Indeed, with the reforms of Cleisthenes, there 
“was a growing political consciousness and sense of power,” which “showed 
itself most clearly in the Athenian willingness to innovate in the conduct of 
their public affairs” (Sinclair 1988, 14). In one important instance, Athenians 
grew to dislike their practice of ostracism, in place for about two-thirds of 
a century. It entailed exiling men considered to be political troublemakers, 
men who were engaged in activities which many believed were endanger-
ing democracy. So around 415, they effectively replaced ostracism with the 
graphe paranomon (“prosecution for introducing illegal measures”). With 
this procedure, a charge could be laid by a citizen against any other citizen 
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who had introduced into the Assembly, or was about to propose, a law (or 
more accurately, a “decree”) which the accuser maintained was “unconstitu-
tional.” The matter was resolved in court by jurors after listening to the cases 
put forward by both prosecutor and defendant. As a result, a measure passed 
in the Assembly could be voided by men sitting as a court (many of whom 
may have approved the offending measure while sitting in their role as mem-
bers of the Assembly). The graphe paranomon served as a peaceful way of 
settling disagreements.
Another significant reform occurred after 399. It mandated that if a pro-
posal for a new law was passed by the Assembly, it then had to be sent to a 
board of nomothetai (“law-setters”), a subset of the 6,000 dikasts appointed 
for the year, for further discussion and approval (or rejection). Speeches 
were made for and against the proposed law. The creation of new laws, 
then, was still the job of hundreds of Athenian citizens. What this procedure 
did was to remove “a lot of tedious and often technical business from the 
Assembly, whose agendas were crowded enough” (Thorley 2004, 60). In 
effect, the Assembly entrusted the “final decision to what they saw as simply 
a large, random, and representative cross-section of themselves” (Stockton 
1990, 82). The Assembly still maintained other important functions, includ-
ing declaring war, making peace treaties, imposing taxes, and constructing 
public works.
After 451/450, Athenians helped to solidify their democracy by paying cit-
izens a daily rate for their time on the Council and the courts as well as their 
work as magistrates. After c. 400, a daily payment was also put in place for 
attendance at the Assembly. These payments, along with regular assignments 
in the navy (Athens was almost continually at war), served as extensive forms 
of government employment, especially for the very poor. This public-sector 
work, in particular its overtly democratic component, did not go down well 
with some members of society. Indeed, “nothing else in classical Athenian 
institutions so enraged anti-democratic publicists” (Finley 1983, 34). In the 
ancient world, whenever oligarchs took power back from democrats, they 
quickly moved to abolish payments for public service. In doing so, they were 
able to limit access to state offices to rich men, those who could afford to 
spend their days autocratically governing the lives of the vast majority.
At Athens, the major reforms implemented from Solon’s time to the mid-
fifth century were generally attempts to restrict the power of the well-heeled 
and spread that power more evenly throughout the citizenry. The upshot was 
that free men did not have to look up at a state which administered them in a 
“top-down” fashion. Rather, citizens were in the driver’s seat in a way, and 
for a length of time (measured in centuries), that has never been matched 
by any polity in human history, before or since. Through their presence in 
the Assembly, Council, and courts, Athenians had effective control of the 
6 Chapter 1
entire state. This included the creation of new laws, which were grounded in 
the morals and intellectual capabilities of a sample of everyday citizens. It 
included as well the interpretation of those laws, whereby in courts, a mass 
of run-of-the-mill men (typically 501 of them) sat in judgement of all those 
facing prosecution, including the most affluent members of society.
The elite lacked the institutional ability to reclaim the powers their ances-
tors had once seized but lost, and so they were unable to prevent or veto deci-
sions made by the majority. These decisions were almost certainly accurate 
reflections of public opinion, rooted in the Athenian belief that “the collec-
tive wisdom of a large group was inherently greater than the wisdom of any 
of its parts” (Ober 1989, 163). What made Athens unique was that its gover-
nance principle was based on rotation, not representation, the latter enabling 
one person to speak and vote on behalf of many others. By directly “repre-
senting” themselves, Athenians were immersed, on a frequent basis, in the 
culture and practices of their democracy. The consequence of their political 
arrangements was that the number of citizens “who were actively involved 
in public duties and responsibilities was simply staggering” (Stockton 1990, 
112). In sum, Athenians looked at their democracy and concluded that
whatever was lost in speed, expertise, and continuity was counterbalanced by 
the constraints which were erected against the emergence of over-powerful 
ministries and unrepresentative and irresponsive bureaucracies, by the wide 
pool of practical experience, local knowledge, and common sense that was 
drawn on, by the provision of a platform for the free expression of every inter-
est, in short by the absence of that “them-and-us” dichotomy between gov-
ernment and governed which has been so marked a feature of so many other 
societies. (113)
But not all Athenians would have agreed with this sentiment. The views of 
the critics of democracy began with an attack on the word “demos” itself, 
which could refer to the entire citizenry, and is how the poor understood the 
term. Conversely, “demos” was used in a more pejorative sense, by people 
like the philosophers, to mean one part of the citizenry, the “lesser” part, the 
ordinary folk. Many aristocrats looked at these individuals and concluded 
that they were “common,” yet they had, regrettably, come to control the main 
institutions of government. Demokratia (democracy), a word coined around 
the 450s, referred to the power that these men of modest means had over their 
wealthier counterparts. Aristocrats recognized that democracy was an overt 
attack on economic, social, and political hierarchies, so it is not surprising 
that anti-democratic theories quickly followed on the heels of the develop-
ment, in practice, of massive popular participation in governance.
At Athens, a number of writers saw democracy as a tyranny led by the 
“base,” “vile,” and “irrational,” a despotism concocted by the poor to oppress 
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the rich. The “vulgar” were a group of people with inbred character flaws 
who were trying, and failing, to rise above their station. The main drawback 
of the poor was the fact that they acted on gut instincts rather than reasoned, 
logical thought. Being ignorant, they were easily swayed, especially by cun-
ning orators.
Socrates, for one, maintained that “statecraft was a highly skilled specialty 
only capable of being mastered by a small, refined, and educated elite” (Wood 
and Wood 1978, 84), by men of leisure, all of whom just happened to be 
members of the aristocracy. In a critique of Athenian democracy, he claimed 
that “a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers” (quoted in 
Wood and Wood 1978, 98). He said that in the Assembly, if there is a build-
ing project, they consult architects; if there is a ship to be constructed, they 
consult naval designers. But on more important matters having to do with the 
governance of the polis, the Assembly accepted the judgement of men like 
blacksmiths and shoemakers – and even men “lower” than these – with each 
and every one of them “unable to point to anybody as his teacher” (quoted in 
Wood and Wood 1978, 100).
Plato’s political philosophy was grounded in a similar conviction, that “to 
earn a livelihood, and especially by means of manual labour, corrupts the 
soul and disqualifies a man for politics, making it not only justifiable but 
necessary for him to subject himself to the command of others” (Wood and 
Wood, 1978, 53–54). In turn, he argued that government should be run by 
cultured men, the “philosopher-kings,” those who had the money necessary to 
purchase tutors and the time required to think about public policy. For Plato, 
virtue cannot be taught; it is inaccessible to most human beings, because they 
are not of noble birth. This is particularly the case for ordinary labourers and 
craftsmen, “whose souls a life of drudgery has warped and maimed” (quoted 
in Wood and Wood 1978, 144).
Finally, Aristotle argued more strongly for the idea of collective wisdom, 
a type of which, he maintained, was evident in the Assembly, but he also 
believed that political offices should be reserved for the well born, those who 
are naturally superior to others, who would make the best rulers. The men 
who govern should not include those who practice “sordid crafts,” “vulgar 
arts,” or “servile occupations” (quoted in Wood and Wood 1978, 221). In his 
view, labourers should play only marginal roles in public life, perhaps some-
thing similar to the ones they play in present-day representative democracies, 
where their activities as citizens generally involve little more than casting an 
occasional ballot every few years.
The amazing political experiment that was Athenian democracy ended with 
its defeat by the Macedonians in the Lamian War in 322 BC. An oligarchic 
system was imposed from the outside, new property qualifications for citizen-
ship were put in place (disenfranchising about two-thirds of the citizenry), and 
8 Chapter 1
a tyrant was installed in 318. In the ensuing decades, a number of attempts 
were made to restore democracy, but by the late 260s, after further military 
defeats, “Athens permanently entered the ranks of the subject city-states with 
paltry politics, the victim of superior external force” (Finley 1983, 117).
Athens had “a dynamic political system,” which apart from two brief 
oligarchic coups in 411–410 and 404–403, “went on for the best part of 
200 years” (Hansen 1999, 22). This unparalleled city-state “came as near as 
any community ever has to achieving the democratic ideal of government by 
the people themselves, through citizen participation” (Arblaster 1994, 19). It 
was, at the same time, a polis that, from our modern perspective, suffered at 
least two serious flaws. First, the population consisted of a number of slaves, 
typically individuals captured in war (as well as their descendants). Slaves 
had no political rights, and they could be bought or sold. They worked in their 
masters’ homes or their fields. Slaves were also wage-labourers, completing 
tasks side by side with free men, both earning the same incomes. A few slaves 
were well-off, including bankers, though far more were worked to death, such 
as many of those who toiled in the wretched silver mines. Second, women 
also lacked political rights. Similar to almost all societies down to the twen-
tieth century, the men of Athens viewed their female relatives as unfit for 
public life and so relegated them to the private sphere, where their main role 
was to beget children.
Slaves and women certainly undertook much of the labour in Athens, 
though it should not be overlooked that the vast majority of Athens’ citizens 
had to work for a living as well; the only exception was a rather tiny group 
of privileged persons. As it turns out, “political activity only occupied a 
fraction of the time of the individual citizen” (Hansen 1999, 318) and, for 
the most part, did not interfere with his work life. While slaves and women 
were prevented from participating in politics, what makes Athens stand out 
was that the status of labourer – even a penniless man who owned no land – 
was not used as a means of exclusion from citizenship. This was almost 
certainly unique in the world until the late eighteenth century. Poorer, free 
men somehow forced their way into politics over the course of a couple of 
centuries, eventually managing to dominate public policy in a way that has 
gone unmatched in any society to this day.
The groundbreaking democracy at Athens, which had shattered all para-
digms of how people could – and should – be governed, required sustained 
violence, perpetrated against it by outsiders, before it was abolished. Com-
pared to other regimes, both before and after its time, Athens was an emi-
nently agreeable place to live. It experienced no peasant revolts or urban 
mobs, both of which were features of non-democratic, highly inegalitarian 
societies. As long as democrats were in control, it also witnessed no violent 
acts of repression perpetrated against the masses, engineered by narrow 
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cliques, led by unaccountable monarchs, nobles, and their willing henchmen. 
Despite the constant complaints of its philosopher-critics, the exceptional 
citizen-state of Athens somehow “managed for nearly two hundred years to 
be the most prosperous, most powerful, most stable, most peaceful internally, 
and culturally by far the richest state in all the Greek world” (Finley 1985, 
23). After its death at Athens, the idea of democracy would not re-emerge as 
a topic of serious, sustained public debate anywhere in the world for nearly 
two millennia.
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
In the early modern era, many political theorists were advocating in favour 
of “mixed” governments, which supposedly contained a proper “balance” 
in the elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. In Britain, these 
were incorporated, respectively, in a king or queen, the House of Lords, and 
the House of Commons. In these proposals, however, the democratic ele-
ment was such that the people, in effect, had little power. For instance, in the 
British case, all members of the House of Commons were well-off and were 
elected by a small percentage of men. The “democratic” aspect of this type 
of state had nothing in common with the powers held by ordinary citizens at 
Athens. Mixed governments were espoused by theorists because they were, 
at heart, aristocratic. The wealthy understood this too, seeing them as “stable” 
and “prudent,” even when, as in the case of the Roman republic, slave and 
plebeian uprisings occurred from time to time and were typically met by ruth-
less state violence.
It was in England in particular that ideas of mixed government were 
merged with what came to be known as “liberalism.” Liberal ideas are rooted 
in the need to monitor and, when necessary, reign in oppressive states. Liber-
als tended to see government as necessary but also as potentially authoritar-
ian. This is why restrictions had to be placed on state actions. Over time, the 
importance of having a constitution, written or unwritten, was also stressed. It 
would entrench a “separation of powers” between the legislature, the execu-
tive (“cabinet”), and the courts, in order to help protect against tyranny. Con-
stitutions would place limits on what elected governments could do, while 
courts would serve as guardians of the rights of the people.
Liberals also advocated for a minimalist state, notably where economic 
activities and private lives were concerned. They considered it especially 
essential that the state’s ability to expropriate or regulate private property 
must not be undertaken haphazardly. Another important aspect of the liberal 
state was the idea of “rule of law,” that law had to be administered fairly by 
an impartial judiciary, who treated everyone equally and were at arm’s length 
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from other state institutions, such as the monarchy. In addition, liberals have 
defended the practices of free speech and freedom of choice in one’s personal 
life, as long as one did not harm others. Finally, liberals have supported 
tolerance of religious diversity and rejected as illegitimate the idea of a state- 
mandated religion (summed up in the phrase “separation of church and state”).
While ideas like these were important advances for humanity, hard-fought 
victories one and all, liberals did not, however, make arguments in favour of 
democracy until relatively recently, and when they did, they did not under-
stand it in terms of extensive, society-wide, popular powers, which was the 
essence of democracy at Athens. This aspect of liberal theory should be kept 
in mind. It means, for instance, that the practice of “rule of law” and the pres-
ence of courts to place constraints on the use of power are liberal ideas. In 
contrast, having ordinary people exercise power is a democratic idea.
New interpretations of “democracy” burst on to the scene in the modern era 
in the course of the American Revolution, when colonists were determined to 
break away from the “oppressive” British and build a new nation from scratch. 
The main question they had to answer was: How shall we govern ourselves? 
In this process, America’s Founding Fathers made it clear that they had no 
intention of creating a democracy. In fact, they argued strenuously against 
Athenian democracy as a model to be emulated by themselves or anyone 
else. James Madison claimed that in assemblies which could be attended by 
any citizen, “passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason” (quoted in 
Roberts 1994, 181). A large group would automatically descend into chaos, 
he believed, regardless of which individuals composed it, adding: “Had every 
Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have 
been a mob” (quoted in Roberts 1994, 181). Not to be outdone, John Adams 
claimed that at Athens, “from the first to the last moment of her democratical 
constitution, levity, gayety, inconstancy, dissipation, intemperance, debauch-
ery, and a dissolution of manners, were the prevailing character of the whole 
nation” (quoted in Roberts 1994, 183).
In turn, writers like James Madison proposed establishing a republic, 
which he defined as “a Government in which the scheme of representation 
takes place” (quoted in Dunn 2005, 77). Republics were states without mon-
archies, but also ones where individuals were supposed to have important 
roles in governing themselves. Republicanism not only involved getting rid 
of the monarchy and extending the vote but also marked a change of politi-
cal culture. It supposedly blossomed best in societies with large numbers 
of independent, farmer-owner-citizens who no longer wished, as in the 
American case, to remain child-like subjects of the English king. In this pol-
ity, personal success would not depend on birth, on who your parents were 
(from aristocrats to paupers), but rather on ability, hard work, and obtaining 
an education.
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As a part of the growing conversation on how to move forward, many non-
elite individuals throughout what would become the United States made it 
clear that they too wished to join this new movement for freedom, wanting to 
play a role in government, particularly through a greatly expanded vote, with 
some even making the case for a form of economic egalitarianism. Numerous 
women, Native Americans, African slaves, freed Blacks, and poor Whites 
demanded that their rights be recognized as well. Most “gentlemen” did not 
like this idea, saying they found it unpalatable to participate in government 
with the likes of people, for example, whose only skill was knowing how “to 
cobble an old shoe” (quoted in G. Wood 2003, 51), never mind individuals 
who were of a different gender or skin colour.
The Founding Fathers advocated for the creation of “representative democ-
racy,” a term that had one of its first uses in a 1777 letter by Alexander 
Hamilton. He defined it as a type of government rooted in elections, in which 
“the exercise of the legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities is vested 
in select persons” (quoted in Dunn 2005, 226n7). This method of governance 
would constitute indirect rule, mediated by men who owned substantial 
property (including, for many of them, large numbers of African slaves). 
Representative democracy was seen as superior to direct democracy because 
it apparently enabled the brightest citizens to govern (in the most exemplary 
cases, perhaps akin to Plato’s philosopher-kings), and these “select persons” 
would supposedly do so in the public interest, in the interest of a majority.
Those who owned much wealth wanted to create a government based 
on “representative principles,” one, as James Madison put it, which would 
be run by “a small number of citizens elected by the rest” (quoted in Held 
2006, 73). But how could they meet this goal? Their practical task, as it turns 
out, “was to sustain a propertied oligarchy with the electoral support of a 
popular multitude” (Wood 1994, 77). They accomplished this by maximiz-
ing the distance between mass and elite, between people and power. They 
put federal governance in the hands of a few hundred individuals who were 
not demographically representative of the population; all of them were white 
males, and almost all of them were extremely well-off. These men would sit 
in Congress, and so stand in for millions of what advocates of this system 
expected would be generally passive citizens (or at least not “active” in the 
Athenian sense).
A large republic rather than, say, a confederation of states, combined with 
local, New England–styled town meetings, would make a prototype of Athe-
nian democracy (or even a milder version of it) an impossibility. Elections 
were the key to subverting rule by the demos and could be used to create a 
constitution that, while not monarchical, was a far cry from “democracy” as 
Athenians understood the term. What is noticeable about this momentous 
event is that it was during the American Revolution that “democracy” was 
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substantially redefined as “not the exercise of political power but its relin-
quishment, its transfer to others, its alienation” (Wood 1994, 62). Modern 
representative democracy, then, was purposefully designed to keep ordinary 
people as far away as possible from power.
The question of what “democracy” meant – and whether it was a good 
thing or bad – continued into the nineteenth century. For instance, in Britain, 
as pressure mounted to achieve universal manhood suffrage, arguments were 
made opposing even this limited right of citizenship. At this time, democracy 
was defended almost exclusively by socialists and anarchists. By 1867, in the 
British debate on the Reform Act, even an MP like John Bright, known as a 
fairly radical liberal, could bluntly declare: “I do not pretend myself to be a 
democrat” (quoted in Arblaster 1994, 46). Many people, both advocates and 
critics of mass voting, felt it would consistently produce governments with 
socialist leanings, since ordinary workers were the overwhelming majority 
of the population. This did not happen, to the great relief of elites, as large 
sections of the lower classes supported – and still support – liberal and con-
servative parties. By the early twentieth century, the fears of the rich had 
subsided, and so the novel form of limited representative democracy, which 
had emerged in the previous century or so, could win acceptance from upper 
classes. They came to realize that changes to voting rules – opening up the 
franchise to more men and eventually women – did not endanger their owner-
ship of vast amounts of property. By the 1920s, the tide had turned so much 
that the leading opponents of democracy were vile, terrifying men such as 
Benito Mussolini, Adolph Hitler, and Joseph Stalin. Things went so far that, 
in the post–World War II era, virtually any nation that was not Communist 
could claim the mantle of democracy, at least in the eyes of the American 
government, even if it harboured an authoritarian bent (e.g. South Vietnam in 
the 1960s or Pinochet’s Chile).
For the longest time, people who self-identified as “liberals” and “repub-
licans” saw little need for democracy. They fought, tooth and claw, every 
extension of democratic processes, including the granting of the vote. In the 
course of these battles, part of the struggle was over what constituted democ-
racy, and when the dust had settled, the reengineered definition that emerged 
no longer meant “popular participation in government”; instead, “democracy” 
had become synonymous with liberalism (Wood 1994). In sum, what hap-
pened during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that our understanding 
of democracy was “revised, adapted, narrowed, and diluted to render it com-
patible with the persisting belief in the necessity or the virtue of rule by elites, 
with an equally persistent mistrust of ‘the masses’ ” (Arblaster 1994, 51–52).
In the first half of the twentieth century, economist Joseph Schumpeter 
(1883–1950) was perhaps the leading proponent of this type of “democracy.” 
He said the role of citizens was simply to choose between competing elites, 
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coalesced in a few political parties, who would serve as their governors. 
Schumpeter was adamant that the “voters outside of parliament must respect 
the division of labor between themselves and the politicians they elect” 
(quoted in Held 2006, 150). Despite his negative view of ordinary people, 
Schumpeter, like almost all liberal-democratic theorists, believed that these 
people should have the right to vote, though he never explained why such 
individuals were smart enough to cast a ballot but too dumb to do much 
of anything else. Perhaps this was so because if the final “voting domino” 
had ever fallen, then the problematic nature of his theory would have been 
well and truly exposed. Schumpeter’s is a self-described pro-democratic 
philosophy, though one that “seems to cede almost everything to opponents 
of democracy” (Held 2006, 144), including the notion that the electorate is 
basically emotional, impulsive, uneducated, infantile, and easily manipu-
lated. In this “elitist” theory, the “ideals and methods of democracy become, 
by default, the ideals and methods of the existing democratic systems” 
(Held 2006, 166). Proposed changes to these systems are usually portrayed 
as unrealistic or undesirable (always, of course, in the guise of defending 
democracy).
Today, to “have a democracy means to have no monarch, no dictator, no 
aristocracy, no junta” (Roberts 1994, 46–47). The definition of a successfully 
functioning democracy seems to be one that is not subject to virulent, open 
conflicts involving extensive police presence in the streets and endangerment 
of lives and properties. Democracy today is basically about avoiding violent, 
autocratic rule, while protecting the most elementary civil and political rights. 
The main thing that citizens can accomplish with their votes, then, is to protect 
themselves from tyranny, by dismissing their rulers. This is an important and 
valuable power, for sure, though one that should be seen as the beginning – 
and not the end – of the creation of vibrant and effective democracies.
Having a mostly passive electorate was met with approval by elites 
and, in the immediate post–World War II era, by most political scientists, 
especially those who espoused “pluralist” theory. They surmised that a col-
lection of people with not much to say – and few ways to say it – was pref-
erable to an ever-demanding citizenry. Even having more than two political 
parties (the minimum necessary to claim status as a democracy) was seen as 
a bad idea, because social cohesion would be threatened. This was so even 
if it meant suppressing smaller parties through the genius of “first past the 
post” electoral systems (e.g. those used in Canada, the United States, and 
much of the UK), making it extremely difficult for them to gain a toehold 
in legislatures.
Pluralism is perhaps still the most commonly accepted theory of how pub-
lic policy works. It suggests that “interest groups” or “pressure groups” are 
at the heart of modern democracy. Government is a referee, settling disputes 
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between groups, all of whom can have their voices heard. At the same time, 
no single interest is able to dominate agenda-creation, the processes of speak-
ing for or against proposals, or decision-making. This competition between 
groups involves much debate and mediation, in which no one interest has 
excessive influence. The political system is rational, and it is always the best 
possible solution to any problem or issue, the one with the most evidence in 
its favour, which gets implemented, even if it has required bargaining between 
groups and some necessary trade-offs, producing a variety of compromises.
Critics contended that the “pluralists’ analysis of the conditions of political 
involvement was extraordinarily naïve” (Held 2006, 169). One problem with 
the theory was its insistence that a lack of political involvement on the part 
of the mass of people was not to be interpreted as apathy or some form of 
structural exclusion. Rather, it meant that most people were pleased with the 
way their government operated and were supportive of the policies it put in 
place. In the 1960s, the theory was questioned, particularly in its American 
heartland, which was rocked by uprisings including, among others, the civil 
rights movement led by African Americans as well as growing opposition to 
the Vietnam War. In this light, critics cast doubt on the idea that all groups 
had a roughly equal ability to be heard by the state. As a result, many plural-
ists revised their theories to acknowledge that some groups were in fact much 
more powerful than others, recognizing the disproportional public policy vic-
tories achieved by organizations that were backed by substantial wealth. Plu-
ralists became more sensitive to inequalities rooted in class, race, and gender. 
Even in its updated guise, however, pluralism is not particularly insightful 
at explaining what governments choose not to do. For example, not a single 
state in the world has established long-term full employment, and none pro-
vides its citizens with unconditional basic incomes. Interest groups and activ-
ists try to influence where governments are going, though many of them with 
perfectly reasonable and affordable demands have failed decade after decade 
(see, for example, the struggle, since the 1930s, to establish “Medicare for 
all” in the United States). Pluralism still does not provide effective answers to 
the questions: What gets on government agendas? And who is best positioned 
to get items on those agendas?
In ancient Athens, an advanced, sophisticated direct democracy existed, 
one where political power was almost exclusively in the hands of the “com-
mon man,” one where access to decision-making was constantly available and 
was never blocked by a barricade of “representatives.” In our current “demo-
cratic” system, universal suffrage gives us representatives, men and women 
who have to be somewhat sensitive to their constituents’ concerns; otherwise, 
they risk defeat at the polls. Despite this, there is not much accountability in 
the long periods between elections. In a critique of this state of affairs, typi-
cal of England’s representative democracy, French philosopher Jean-Jacques 
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Rousseau (1712–1778) famously said: “The English people believes itself to 
be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only during the election of Members 
of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people is enslaved; 
it is nothing” (quoted in Held 2006, 46). While perhaps a somewhat harsh 
assessment, it is the case that with strict party discipline in parliamentary 
systems, it is possible for legislators to vote, on a regular basis, against the 
wishes of a majority of their constituents, especially if those legislators won 
their seats by, say, less than 40 per cent of the vote. Today, the people, as it 
turns out, “have strikingly little control over what their representatives actu-
ally do in their name” (Arblaster 1994, 81). These same people also have, as 
Rousseau long ago intimated, limited ability to have their voices heard on a 
routine basis.
VOICES OF THE PEOPLE
In representative democracies, the processes through which individuals talk 
to their governments are well known. Aside from voting and public protest, 
citizens frequently make their voices heard, typically as members of interest 
groups and through presentations before legislative committees. They can 
also, if they like, meet with their local representative, as can any of his or 
her constituents. Both forms of participation, however, tend to be employed 
disproportionately by a distinct subset of people, those who are well-off and 
well-educated, who have the financial and intellectual capital required to 
“work the system.” The ways that governments engage the public usually 
involve politically active citizens pushing their own agendas. They rarely 
require that these “pushy” citizens listen to and deliberate with those with 
whom they are prone to disagree.
In addition to the aforementioned points, governments throughout the 
democratic world rely on three primary methods to solicit input from their 
populations; however, all of these information-gathering techniques have 
serious drawbacks. First, politicians invariably pay close attention to opinion 
polls. This is not surprising as it is their job to represent the people, so they 
need to know what the people are thinking, and especially how they might 
be divided on any given issue. The problem with opinion polls is that most 
of them produce dubious results, so much so that they should be taken with 
a grain of salt. This is true even for “scientific” polls that sample a group 
which represents the population on a number of variables, such as gender, 
geographic area of residence, and age.
For example, a February 2016 survey by the Angus Reid Institute claimed 
that 70 per cent of Canadians believed the government was on track with its 
promise to take in 25,000 Syrian refugees, though those interviewed also 
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maintained that that should represent an upper limit to the number accepted. 
Canadians appeared to be saying loudly and clearly: “25,000 is fine, but we 
definitely don’t want any more!” The poll, therefore, suggested that the gov-
ernment should back away from its larger commitment to allow in 50,000 
asylum seekers. The government, the media reported confidently, was in the 
process of implementing a policy “at odds with what the majority of Canadi-
ans want” (Hobson 2016). But was this in fact the case? Would the govern-
ment have been wise to abandon its policy? And would it have been showing 
great respect to democracy – and the apparent will of the majority – by doing 
so? To answer these questions, and to highlight why using a poll to inform 
government action is inappropriate, let’s consider the original question Angus 
Reid pollsters asked (note that 15,000 was the number of refugees already in 
Canada when the poll was conducted):2
Some people say the government shouldn’t stop at resettling 25,000 refugees, 
and should take in more than that. What do you think is the ideal number of 
Syrian refugees Canada should accept in addition to the ones who have already 
come/are coming?
• No more – stop now at 15,000
• Stop at 25,000 – that’s enough
• An additional 1,000 to 5,000
• An additional 5,000 to 10,000
• An additional 10,000 to 15,000
• An additional 15,000 to 20,000
• An additional 20,000 to 25,000
• More than 25,000
• No limit
Now let’s picture a typical respondent to this poll. Perhaps she is sitting in 
a hot tub drinking tequila when out of the blue someone phones to ask how 
many refugees Canada should accept. Does this respondent decide on the spot 
that a higher number of refugees would adversely affect the demand for, say, 
housing, health care, English-language teachers, food banks, and so on? What 
makes her think Canada could successfully integrate 25,000 newcomers but 
not, say, 35,000? How, in other words, do interviewees make their determina-
tions in an instant? It would be interesting to know how this individual – and 
how the majority of interviewees – settled on 25,000, as opposed to recom-
mending stopping at 15,000. Conversely, why were so few willing to say 
“more than 25,000” (i.e. more than 50,000 overall)?
As we will see, ordinary citizens are capable of intelligent commentary on 
a host of public issues, but only after they have studied the available options 
in detail. Opinion polls, in contrast, merely record unreflective guesswork. 
Responses truly are opinion, a form of commentary that never needs to be 
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justified with good reasons. In terms of how a society proceeds in determin-
ing its commitment to refugees, this poll, like virtually all polls on complex 
issues, is irrelevant. While only one among countless possible examples, it 
highlights precisely why we need to rid ourselves, once and for all, of the bad 
habit of poll-driven public policy.
Second, governments occasionally appoint “blue-ribbon panels” consisting 
of business or political elites to give advice in areas where the government 
is planning to initiate reforms. For instance, in 2014, the premier of Ontario 
appointed a three-person panel to explore the possibility of privatizing select 
crown corporations. It included Ed Clark, chair of TD Bank, described as 
“Premier Kathleen Wynne’s privatization czar”; former Conservative cabinet 
minister Janet Ecker; and former New Democratic Party (NDP) cabinet min-
ister Frances Larkin. The panel recommended that the government offload 
some small-scale utilities, but it was opposed to anything resembling a fire 
sale. Mr Clark told the media that we “should not rush to sell assets; rushed 
sales are not in the public interest” (quoted in Benzie 2014).
These panel members were seemingly chosen to represent the diversity of 
the province’s main political parties. Yet, regardless of what one might think 
of the members or their recommendations, the fact remains that this panel 
consisted of just three people who, statistically speaking, could not possibly 
represent – or stand in for – Ontario’s fourteen million citizens. Furthermore, 
why were these individuals chosen, and hence given so much influence over 
a critically important public policy? Many observers might well answer that 
the premier, like so many politicians before her, handpicked a panel to tell 
her what she wanted to hear.
Third, and finally, governments sometimes create task forces of experts 
to examine an issue in order to garner input. For instance, in 2016, the 
federal Liberal government appointed a group of nine people, including 
professors and physicians, to review the proposed legalization and regula-
tion of marijuana. The task force came under immediate criticism, how-
ever, for the choice of Anne McLellan, a former Liberal MP, as its chair. 
What irked some observers was the fact that, while serving in the federal 
cabinet in 2005, McLellan told the media that the government is “not in 
the business of legalizing marijuana. We are in the business of putting 
in place a new penalty regime for small amounts of marijuana” (quoted 
in Emery 2016). In the “comments” section at the end of an article by 
pro-legalization advocate Marc Emery (2016), one citizen commentator 
(Dave Stevenson) had this to say about the decision to appoint McLellan 
and her colleagues:
A committee, composed only of life-long pot opponents, is unlikely to recom-
mend any sort of legalization.
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The committee will cherry-pick its witnesses, screening out anyone who 
doesn’t subscribe to their antiquated fear and loathing. When it comes to writing 
their report, sometime in the indefinite future, they will tell [Prime Minister Jus-
tin] Trudeau what he wants to hear: “Canadians don’t want legalization; indeed 
they want MORE people locked up.”
Trudeau will then have extricated himself from a mess of his own making. 
He will be able to stand up and tell Canadians that their voices have been heard, 
that he will continue the tireless campaign to keep them safe from the scourge 
of marihuana.
Concerned citizens might have regarded, rightly or wrongly, any recommen-
dations from this task force as the work of a group of “elites.” As it turned 
out, in December 2016, the task force recommended that the sale of mari-
juana be made legal, and it gave the government advice on how the market 
for this product should be regulated, yet its recommendations did not end the 
cannabis controversy.
Within days of the release of the task force’s report, Emery and a handful 
of others were arrested in Montreal for operating illegal marijuana shops. 
Politicians – federal, provincial, and municipal – were adamant that the cur-
rent laws would be fully enforced until new legislation was in place. Dana 
Larsen (2016), the director of Sensible BC Campaign for Marijuana Reform, 
may have signalled Emery’s strategy in early 2016 when he maintained that 
“it is civil disobedience against the unjust pot prohibition laws that has gotten 
us to the verge of legalization. We must keep up that momentum as we enter 
into the final stretch of our cannabis campaign.” He added: “Our movement 
has never been based on patiently waiting for politicians to grant us freedom. 
Cannabis liberation is about peaceful defiance and standing up against unjust 
laws, not only with words, but with concrete action.” These acts of defiance 
included the smoking habits of the roughly 20 per cent of Canadians who 
admit to using marijuana at least once a year.
The sale and consumption of small amounts of marijuana became legal 
across Canada in October 2018. The country finally expunged a law long 
seen as illegitimate by millions of people. Still, a CA might have examined 
this law, perhaps fifteen or twenty years ago, and dealt with the matter once 
and for all. Instead, nearing the end of the second decade of the twenty-first 
century, Canada was still wasting roughly half-a-billion dollars each year, 
enforcing a crackdown on a product that might have been made legal decades 
ago, if only citizens had had more direct input into the policymaking process.
The typical ways in which governments solicit information highlight just 
how much we lack institutions that devolve some elements of power to every-
day, unelected citizens – institutions that can draw on broad-based knowledge 
to assist in the development of public policy. This lack has led some observ-
ers to search for practical supplements to our current political system with the 
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goal of addressing one of the major limitations of our democracy. This study 
suggests that public involvement in policymaking should consist of more than 
just ad hoc consultation with individuals and groups that leave many citizens 
suspicious that politicians and bureaucrats have determined an “agenda” in 
advance, and that key decisions have already been made. While the concerns 
of the electorate can be channelled upward in a variety of ways (including 
via opinion polls, individual “czars,” and task forces),3 I propose that the best 
way to do so would be through a formal, entrenched source of consultation 
that incorporates the perspectives of average citizens, which would enable 
people to clearly express their preferences on a host of public controversies. 
On any given issue, we have a valuable collective wisdom, but we will be 
forever unable to accurately discern it unless we construct CAs. Indeed, a 
number of localities have already experimented with these new institutions.
CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLIES
The first large-scale, government-sponsored CA in the world was created in 
2004 by the province of British Columbia (BC) to study the question of elec-
toral reform. It consisted of 160 members from across the province, two from 
each of BC’s seventy-nine provincial ridings, plus two Indigenous members. 
The assembly members worked, mostly over weekends, throughout much of 
the year conducting research, deliberating among themselves, and consulting 
with other citizens, holding over fifty public hearings and accepting 1,600 
written submissions. When they completed this work, they asked themselves 
whether British Columbia should keep its first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral 
system or move to a single-transferable vote (STV) system in which voters 
rank candidates on a ballot. Only eleven members voted to keep FPTP, while 
142 voted for STV. The members of the CA followed up with a second ques-
tion: Do we recommend the STV system to the people of BC? This time, just 
seven said “No” and 146 said “Yes.” The CA then issued a report highlight-
ing what it saw as the drawbacks of the status quo, while also explaining why 
it was recommending a change to the method of voting (BCCAER 2004). In 
an ensuing referendum on the question held in May 2005, 58 per cent of BC 
voters approved the CA’s recommendation, but the provincial legislature, 
which had established a “super majority” threshold of 60 per cent for accep-
tance, rejected the measure. In a second referendum held in 2009, support for 
an STV system fell dramatically from 58 to 39 per cent.4
In 2007, the government of Ontario followed suit, creating its own CA on 
electoral reform, which consisted of one person from each of the province’s 
103 electoral constituencies. This CA worked over many weekends during 
an eight-month period. It likewise conducted research, while engaging in 
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consultation and deliberation. When members had completed their work, 
they asked themselves if Ontario should keep its FPTP electoral system 
or move to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Only sixteen 
voted to keep FPTP, while eighty-six voted for MMP. A second question 
followed: Do we recommend the new system to the people of Ontario? In 
this vote, eight said “No” and ninety-four said “Yes.” Like its BC coun-
terpart, this CA issued a report making the case for its recommendation 
(OCAER 2007). In an October 2007 referendum, 63 per cent of Ontario 
voters rejected the CA’s proposal. A subsequent poll, however, showed a 
majority of voters “believed that assembly members had been hand-picked 
by the government” (Fournier et al. 2011, 134). The public, it seems, was 
ignorant about the issue of electoral reform, the existence of the assembly, 
and the point of the ensuing referendum. This experience underlines a major 
drawback of ad hoc assemblies. They do not have enough time – enough 
history – to generate broad understanding of their role and purpose, hence 
their recommendations lack the power and influence we might expect of 
permanent institutions.
There have been a handful of other CAs throughout the world in recent 
years, some of which originated not from government mandates but rather 
out of civil society organizations. One of these was the Australian Citizens’ 
Parliament (ACP), funded by the Australian Research Council and the new-
Democracy Foundation. It consisted of 150 geographically representative 
members aged eighteen to ninety. They met over a period of four days in 
2009, tasked with answering the question: “How can Australia’s political 
system be strengthened to serve us better?” Their goal was “to imagine what 
a more citizen-friendly, accessible government might look like in the twenty-
first century” (ACP 2009, 3). The ACP then developed its own agenda in the 
course of answering this broad question. The members eventually prioritized 
thirteen ideas for the government to consider. The ACP experiment inspired 
numerous municipalities across Australia to make use of citizens’ juries 
(smaller versions of CAs), including Melbourne, where in 2014 a “People’s 
Panel” consisting of forty-three individuals developed a ten-year financial 
plan for the city. In June 2015, the City Council announced that it was accept-
ing almost all of the panel’s recommendations.
The state of South Australia also made use of a large citizens’ jury (con-
sisting of 350 people) to answer the question: “Under what circumstances, if 
any, could South Australia pursue the opportunity to store and dispose of high 
level nuclear waste from other countries?” A royal commission had proposed 
the idea of a dump, but critics felt this commission had been “stacked” with 
pro-nuclear advocates. In response, South Australia’s premier, Jay Weath-
erill, who was in favour of storing nuclear waste, set up a citizen’s jury to 
examine the royal commission’s recommendations. The positive spin the 
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commission had placed on the project, which suggested it would generate 
$100 billion in income over 120 years, did not impress the jury, which voted 
70 per cent against the project under any circumstances. Their reasons, pro-
vided in a report issued in November 2016, included the lack of Indigenous 
consent and the potential for damage to South Australia’s image as a “green 
state.” The jury also criticized the royal commission’s economic argument, 
saying its findings were “based on unsubstantiated assumptions.” They added 
that “this has caused the forecast estimates to provide inaccurate, optimistic, 
[and] unrealistic economic projections” (SACJNW 2016, 5). Finally, the jury 
was concerned that the state would not properly regulate the nuclear industry, 
and it gave past examples of government failures in this area to support its 
concern.
Similar endeavours to engage the public have been undertaken in Ireland, 
including one by We the Citizens (WTC), which emerged out of a working 
group of the Political Studies Association of Ireland, funded by Atlantic 
Philanthropies. The WTC was organized with the goal of demonstrating that 
citizens had useful ideas on the question of how to reform Ireland’s poli-
tics. Like the Australian Citizens’ Parliament, it examined ways to enhance 
democracy, while also considering government taxation and spending poli-
cies. The WTC’s 100 members met for two days in 2011. Their report recom-
mended, among other things, that the government adopt “a citizens’ assembly 
mechanism to complement and enhance our representative democracy” 
(WTC 2011, 6), suggesting that CAs could be created on an as-needed basis.
The WTC served as a model for Ireland’s 2012 Convention on the Consti-
tution, which completed its work in 2014. The Convention had 100 members: 
a chair, thirty-three politicians, and sixty-six members chosen at random 
from the population. It examined ten issues and made recommendations to 
the Oireachtas (parliament), one of which favoured legalizing gay marriage. 
A referendum was subsequently held in May 2015 on this issue, in which 
62 per cent of voters approved an amendment to the constitution making Ire-
land the sixteenth country in the world to legalize gay marriage and the first 
to do so via a national referendum.
The Irish continued their experiment with the creation of a time-limited 
CA in July 2016, which is considering a number of issues, including climate 
change and an aging population. This CA consists of ninety-nine randomly 
chosen citizens and is chaired by a Supreme Court justice. After it was estab-
lished, political commentator David Van Reybrouck called Ireland “the most 
innovative democracy in Europe,” because it is evolving “from a state of gov-
ernment in which the people have the right to vote to a form of government 
in which the people have the right to speak” (quoted in Humphreys 2016).
The Irish assembly held its inaugural meeting in October 2016, when it 
began its first task: addressing the question of abortion, which was effectively 
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banned under the Eighth Amendment to the Irish constitution, which came 
into effect in 1983. In this predominantly Catholic country, it would be dif-
ficult to imagine a more contentious issue for a CA to consider, yet mem-
bers moved ahead, receiving over 7,700 submissions from the public by the 
December 2016 deadline. In April 2017, the assembly voted 64 per cent to 
recommend changing the law to enable a woman to access an abortion with-
out having to provide a reason for her choice. In a national referendum held 
in May 2018, Irish citizens voted 66 per cent in favour of repealing the Eighth 
Amendment.
In sum, the few CAs that have existed have been given specific tasks, 
which they have laboured on for a limited period, closing up shop when they 
completed their project-oriented work. This book, in contrast, recommends 
the establishment of assemblies as permanent institutions, a topic to which 
we now turn.
NOTES
 1. For an excellent, concise history of ancient Greece, see Martin (2000). For 
brief surveys of Athenian democracy, see Patriquin (2015) and Thorley (2004).
 2. http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2016.02.02_Refugee_solo.pdf.
 3. Governments can use referenda and plebiscites as well, though in countries 
other than Switzerland and the United States, these methods of information gathering 
are rarely employed.
 4. In the fall of 2017, BC’s newly elected NDP minority government (with the 
support of the Green Party) announced that the province would hold a binding ref-
erendum on proportional representation (PR) via mail-in ballot in the fall of 2018. 
The result of the referendum was that 61 per cent of voters chose to remain with the 
first-past-the-post system, “a resounding win for the status quo” (McElroy 2018).
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Chapter 2
How Would a Citizens’  
Assembly Work?
The citizens’ assembly (CA) model outlined in this chapter (which makes 
occasional reference to Canadian institutions) would not require any sig-
nificant modifications to the current state structure, including the House 
of Commons, the Senate, or the governor general. Rooted in direct democ-
racy, a CA would supplement the system of representative democracy, not 
replace it. A CA would be a small, practical step in the direction of greater 
self-governance.
So, how might this assembly work?
FORMATION
A properly constituted CA consists of a representative sample of the entire 
population. The importance of following this basic guideline cannot be 
emphasized enough. As egalitarian and as democratic as it may sound, a CA 
that amounts to an open-invitation consultation session would be a mistake, 
because those who sponsor the consultation would undoubtedly end up with 
a group of relatively high-income earners with education levels that are above 
average. These people would also likely turn out to come almost exclusively 
from urban areas; they might be mostly men; they might include few youth; 
and they might draw heavily from dominant ethnic/religious groups. If 
organizers seek input on any matter, and they search for participants, say, 
by putting advertisements in newspapers, they are highly unlikely to gather 
at their hearings anything resembling a representative group of citizens. For 
example, in the early 1990s, the state of Oregon in the United States exam-
ined the question of expanding free public health care to the poor. Participants 
in the ensuing discussions had more education and earned higher salaries than 
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the average. While these factors hampered data collection to some extent, far 
more problematic was the fact that 70 per cent of the participants worked in 
the health care sector (Fung 2005, 407). These individuals no doubt had valu-
able insights to offer, but the skewing of the occupation variable meant that 
the organizers of this process were not working with men and women who 
came anywhere close to reflecting the overall citizenry.
How then could a Citizens’ Assembly of Canada be populated? To begin, 
I suggest that provincial and territorial membership in the CA should be set 
at half the number of a province or territory’s members of parliament (MPs) 
who sit in the House of Commons (see table 2.1). Doing so would generate a 
sample of ordinary Canadians in what should be an uncontroversial manner, 
thus avoiding quarrels over the geographic breakdown of the assembly.
The next step would be to ensure that the CA’s membership consists of an 
equal number of men and women. Given gender balance and a representative 
geographic sample otherwise chosen at random, the CA would be populated 
by a group that would almost perfectly replicate the nation in all variables 
typically deemed important for purposes of public policy, including age, 
religion, language, sexual orientation, disability, race, ethnicity, income, 
and employment status. For example, if 7 per cent of Canadian adults are 
unemployed, then about twelve members of the citizens’ assembly (MCAs) 
would be jobless. Meanwhile, about twenty-two of the 172 MCAs, including 
a In calculating seats in the CA, a “half number” was rounded up to the next whole number. For example, 
Nova Scotia has eleven seats in the House of Commons. Half of eleven is 5.5, which was then rounded 
up to six.
b See the explanation in note no. 2.
Table 2.1. Provincial and Territorial Membership in a Citizens’ Assembly of Canada









Newfoundland and Labrador 4





Plus up to an additional two Indigenous membersb Maximum of 174
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many of the aforementioned unemployed, would live below Statistics Can-
ada’s low-income cut-off line, generally regarded as the nation’s poverty 
line. Unlike Parliament, which has a vast over-representation of profession-
als, especially lawyers and business people, the CA would truly mirror the 
country’s occupational profile. Each iteration of the CA may not perfectly 
represent all variables, but over time the various characteristics of those who 
serve on CAs would come extremely close to matching those of the citizenry 
at large.
There is one important instance, however, where we might not achieve 
expected levels of representation, and that is of Indigenous peoples, who cur-
rently constitute 4.3 per cent of Canada’s population. Based on where Indig-
enous persons live across Canada, and the number of MCAs assigned to each 
province and territory, by “luck of the draw” we should expect to consistently 
have one Indigenous MCA from each of the provinces of Manitoba and Sas-
katchewan, as well as from the territory of Nunavut. These three individuals, 
however, would make up just 1.7 per cent of MCAs. Therefore, I propose 
that we use stratified random sampling1 to ensure that at least one Indig-
enous person is chosen from Manitoba and Saskatchewan as well as from 
the four largest provinces: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta. 
As a result, in each of these provinces, the percentage of Indigenous MCAs 
would roughly equal the percentage of Indigenous persons in the overall 
population. From these six provinces combined, the CA would draw six 
Indigenous MCAs out of 152 seats allocated in the assembly, or 3.9 per cent, 
which exactly mirrors, to the decimal point, the percentage of Indigenous 
peoples in these provinces. In addition, via luck of the draw, an Indigenous 
person from Nunavut would sit in nine out of every ten CAs; there would be 
an Indigenous person from the Northwest Territories in one out of every two 
assemblies; and there would be an Indigenous person from the Yukon in one 
out of every four assemblies. Combining these three “lucks of the draw,” a 
typical assembly would include two Indigenous MCAs from the territories, 
bringing their overall number in each Assembly from six (guaranteed) to 
(typically) eight (or 4.7 per cent of MCAs).2
In addition to all of the more personal “statuses” noted earlier, the CA 
would precisely reflect the ideological spectrum, from the few socialists on 
the far left to the few libertarians on the far right. Even with a handful of out-
liers on board – men and women who, by the way, have every right to hear 
their views represented in our political institutions – the CA would undoubt-
edly be dominated by members who self-identify as conservatives, liberals, 
and social democrats. With this make-up, we would for the first time obtain 
an accurate portrait of how a true cross-section of the population perceives 
public policies. The CA would reproduce the body politic in miniature. Given 
its composition – and this is the critical point – its recommendations would 
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correspond almost exactly to what Canada’s twenty-five million eligible vot-
ers would say if they could all gather in a room to debate and vote on issues. 
Such a CA would facilitate a reasonable facsimile of a nation-wide conversa-
tion. In short, a small group could get the job done for us, and on any matter 
the choices of these 172 citizens would bear weight because they would be 
the same choices we would all make if we were able to do so.
For the inaugural CA, 172 people would be chosen, half of whom would 
serve two-year terms and the other half, four-year terms. At the two-year 
point, a new group, constituting half of the CA’s total membership, would 
be selected for a four-year term, a method of appointment that would then be 
repeated ad infinitum. This way, the CA would always consist of members 
with at least a couple of years’ experience and others who are relatively new. 
No one would be eligible to serve more than one term. If a mid-term vacancy 
occurred, a replacement could be chosen from a database, but only if there 
were, let’s say, more than six months left in the term. The individual selected 
would come from the same gender and province or territory as the departing 
MCA (e.g. a woman from New Brunswick). Just before commencing their 
duties, all MCAs, and any replacement MCAs, would undergo a training 
period of a few days in length.
MCAs would be selected by lot from those who put their names forward. 
Citizens could “apply” for the job by checking off some boxes on their 
annual income tax return, which would keep them in a database, or, if they 
have no income, by submitting a simple, one-page form online every sec-
ond year to get themselves into the CA “lottery.” The CA would not be like 
jury duty, where individuals are given little choice as to whether or not they 
serve. Because this method of composing the CA involves a process of self-
selection, where a portion of the population would opt out, it may produce a 
slight bias in favour of, for instance, those with higher incomes. If any sig-
nificant and hence unacceptable bias were discovered in the sample, income 
could always be added as a fourth category of selection, in addition to gender, 
geography, and Indigenous status.
There is no doubt that, with this type of process, we would have to deal 
with potentially problematic selections to the CA. For one, it is hoped that 
guardians of others would not put forward the names of any individuals 
who, for whatever reason, are not capable of sitting in the assembly. There 
are many who would be unable to serve: for instance, those struggling with 
addictions that are not yet under control, those suffering from dementia, and 
those serving prison terms. Indeed, being selected as an MCA would not 
automatically entitle one to the position. “Applicants” for the job, like appli-
cants for any job, would need to demonstrate that they have the minimum 
necessary physical and psychological capacities to handle the tasks they 
are assigned. In the process of selection, and once individuals have become 
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MCAs, their new employer, the government of Canada, would of course be 
bound by the “duty to accommodate” people with disabilities, a duty now 
enshrined in many human rights codes. And MCAs, like any employees, 
could be disciplined for, among other things, harassing co-workers or repeat-
edly violating employment rules, and they could be fired for just cause, with 
the work of carrying out these unpleasant tasks perhaps assigned to senior 
civil servants in human resources, who would also ensure that MCAs have 
proper grievance procedures at their disposal.
Finally, in order to facilitate maximum participation, employers would be 
required to grant unpaid leaves of absence to any employees selected to serve 
on the CA. If an MCA’s employer were still operating after the four-year term 
expired, the employer would be expected to provide their former employee 
with a job – preferably the same job – which would pay an amount at least 
equal to the position the MCA left.3
AGENDA
In order for the CA to succeed, it must control its agenda. If it does not, and its 
agenda is determined by Parliament, it would lose the ability to choose which 
topics to address, and hence would not operate nearly as well as it could if left 
to its own devices. Indeed, if the critically important power of agenda setting 
does not remain within the auspices of the CA, it would not be an experiment 
worth undertaking. A CA that could choose which matters it addressed and 
which it ignored would have something significant to add to public discourse. 
It is true of perhaps all political systems worldwide, even the most democratic 
ones, that they are “effective in preventing issues potentially dangerous to 
the defenders of the status quo from reaching the decision-making agenda” 
(Bachrach and Botwinick 1992, 14). A CA could help to change a situation in 
which, as one writer noted regarding the build-up of nuclear arms, it “is non-
sense to talk of rule by the people when such questions cannot even get on to 
the political agenda” (Burnheim 1985, 41–42). All political parties are afraid 
to broach difficult issues, such as the decriminalization of certain drugs, safe 
injection sites for addicts, and doctor-assisted dying. A CA would be more 
open to examining controversial topics like these, because there would be no 
political fallout for doing so. In the end, a CA may not support the proposals 
made by those advocating for change, but it would at least bring issues, many 
of which are now closeted, into the public arena for serious discussion.
The CA would also alter how we handle such matters. When we consider 
movements that have arisen in the last half-century (e.g. the anti-war move-
ment, gay marriage, racial equality, and women’s rights), we have to con-
clude that most of them “have been promoted by demonstrations and direct 
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action, rather than conventional political activities through parties and legis-
latures” (Budge 1996, 192). Without a CA, citizens often feel they have only 
one option: to mobilize in the streets – an act that, especially on contentious 
issues, has potentially serious consequences for people, police, and property. 
A CA might help to reduce the frequency of protests, which, like low voter 
turnout, are a tell-tale sign that we need to make urgent amendments to our 
representative democracy.
But how would a CA set its agenda? In Parliament, the government of the 
day decides what gets on the order paper; the opposition then reacts to and 
critiques the government’s proposals. While certainly more challenging, with 
no designated leadership driving the agenda, it would not be difficult for the 
CA’s membership to determine how to proceed. Based on the amount of 
time available, it could decide which items to tackle and in what order. For 
example, every year or so, each MCA might propose a few agenda items. 
Many members would likely make the same proposals. Once duplicates were 
removed, and with further modifications, the complete list could be whittled 
down to perhaps ten or fifteen items. A vote would be held on which five or 
six would proceed to further debate. The winning issues would move forward. 
Perhaps a committee of the CA, with the help of staff, could determine a time 
allocation for each item, with complex matters allocated more hours. The CA 
could also choose, at any point, to move an “emergency” matter to the top 
of its agenda. In addition, the House of Commons could request that the CA 
respond to a specific question, though the assembly would not be obligated 
to agree to any such request. It might also be a requirement for the CA to 
consider a question from the public if enough signatures could be gathered in 
support. Like similar initiatives in the United States, money would inevitably 
play some role in determining the success rate of such petitions. However, 
even if wealthy backers were able to get a petition accepted, they would have 
succeeded only in getting their question on the agenda. They would still have 
to convince the Citizens’ Assembly – the polity in  miniature – of the merits 
of the case, and they would undoubtedly be opposed by other organized 
interests.
No question would be off-limits to the CA. It would have carte blanche 
to consider any issue it believed merited examination. From the long list of 
contentious matters that have arisen in Canada over the last decade or so, just 
some of the questions a CA would probably have dealt with include:
• Should we abolish the long-gun registry?
• Should we exit the Kyoto Protocol on climate change?
• Should we sign a free trade agreement with the European Union?
• Should we extend the deadline for our military operations in Afghanistan?
• Should we purchase the F-35 military aircraft?
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• Should the age of eligibility for the Old Age Security pension rise from 
sixty-five to sixty-seven?
• Should Canada Pension Plan contributions and benefits be increased and, if 
so, to what level should they rise?
• Should doctor-assisted dying be permitted only for individuals who are ter-
minally ill or also for those who have a “grievous and irremediable illness, 
condition, or disability”?
• Should the recreational use of marijuana be made legal, and, if so, how 
should the drug be produced and sold to consumers?
• Should proposed reforms to the taxation of small businesses be imple-
mented, amended, or rescinded?
The CA would typically address specific policy matters such as those just 
noted through a precise query formulated by a Question Committee, which 
would have a rotating membership of MCAs responsible for each issue as it 
moves up the agenda. Their work would be guided by the fact that there is not 
much point asking a question that would garner little support. With its ques-
tions in hand, the CA would be ready for work. If it were to deal with an aver-
age of one question in each two- or two-and-a-half-month period (assuming 
some time for vacations), the CA could handle about twenty questions over a 
four-year term.4 If a significant body of MCAs felt a given question needed 
to be re-examined, they could bring it back to the CA after a certain period, 
which might depend on the level of support the measure originally received, 
as indicated in table 2.2.5
If a question were brought back for further consideration after the allotted 
time, supporters of the measure would be wise to address some of the con-
cerns noted by the majority who rejected it the first time in hopes the ques-
tion might subsequently pass. Some questions may simply require patience. 
Table 2.2. Wait Times for the Re-examination of Questions
If the percentage vote of the 
losing measure was . . .
then the question could 
be asked again in . . .
more than 40 per cent but 
less than 50 per cent
 3 years
more than 30 per cent but 
less than 40 per cent
 6 years
more than 20 per cent but 
less than 30 per cent
 9 years
more than 10 per cent but 
less than 20 per cent
12 years
more than 0 per cent but 
less than 10 per cent
15 years
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Proposals not accepted immediately might succeed a generation later, just as 
gay marriage would almost certainly have failed in a 1980s CA but passed 
into law in Canada in 2005. In other instances, if a question failed, a differ-
ent one, related to the same issue, could quickly appear on the order paper. 
For example, if MCAs recommended against the purchase of F-35 aircraft 
because they found them too expensive and inappropriate for Canada’s needs, 
they might be open to suggesting the purchase of a different plane. The fact 
that a CA addressed an issue might serve as enough of a catalyst for it to gain 
increased public support – an overt recognition of changing social attitudes. 
A CA would provide the ideal safe haven for burgeoning alterations to our 
political and cultural landscapes to gain momentum, via an institution recog-
nized as legitimate by virtually everyone.
Once the CA made a recommendation, if Parliament did not act on it 
within a period of ten or so years, the CA could choose to revisit the issue. 
This might occur if, for instance, 55 per cent of MCAs recommended a 
measure, but Parliament declined to move because of the close nature of the 
vote. Given its previous report, and readily available research, the CA could 
conduct a review rather expeditiously. If it produced a higher majority than 
before in favour of the measure – say 65 per cent – the increased pressure on 
Parliament might result in action.
DELIBERATIONS
A certain type of deliberation would be essential to the success of the assem-
bly. However, this style of deliberation would not emulate the adversarial 
debate featured in elected legislatures, where the objective of speakers is to 
use any legal means necessary to defeat opponents, those who are not mem-
bers of one’s own political party. In contrast, MCAs would have to attend to 
others, which would include people from different socio economic circles, 
even if not ultimately agreeing with them. The necessity to listen carefully 
is rooted in the work of MCAs, who serve as “a dedicated jury of people 
who do not have an axe to grind, a party to support, or a region that has sent 
them there to fight its corner” (Barnett and Carty 2008, 50). A professional 
facilitator would moderate discussion at the assembly level to ensure a range 
of views was heard. This individual would monitor time-limits, enforce rules 
of procedure (e.g. on parliamentary language), draw out the major arguments 
articulated at various points in the debate, “read” the room, and so on. Like 
the speaker of the House of Commons, the facilitator would have no interest 
in the outcome of the discussion. Any decision made by the facilitator could 
be overruled by the assembly.
Below the level of the general assembly, MCAs would chair smaller “break 
out” groups and committees on a rotating basis. The 172 members of the CA 
 How Would a Citizens’ Assembly Work?  31
would be divided into ten “symposia” of roughly seventeen members, with 
membership in each constant over a two-year period. Two of the ten sym-
posia would use French as their working language. As much as possible, the 
members of any given symposium would reflect a microcosm of the assembly 
itself. For instance, each one would have at least eight men and eight women. 
Every symposium would, in turn, break down into two seminar groups of 
eight or nine members each, in which detailed discussions could be held, 
where everyone would have time to speak while thinking through the costs 
and benefits of a proposal. At the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on 
electoral reform, participants said that small groups were crucial for “learn-
ing, asking questions of clarification, sharing ideas, testing theories, building 
consensus, generating solutions, and so on” (quoted in Smith 2009, 85). Each 
seminar would frequently link up with the other seminar in its symposium to 
compare notes, then all ten symposia would eventually meet in plenary ses-
sions of the assembly. While the activities of the assembly would be held in 
public and recorded, work undertaken in the seminars and symposia would be 
private, akin to a caucus or cabinet meeting, thus allowing for a full and frank 
exchange of views minus the glare of the media spotlight.
One of the main tasks of MCAs in their work at all three “levels” of the 
CA would be to gather the knowledge that would form the basis of their 
eventual recommendation. MCAs would listen to, ask questions of, as well as 
interrogate and critique, expert witnesses on all sides of any question, glean-
ing information from the nation’s public servants, leaders of civil society 
organizations, representatives from the private and voluntary sectors, and 
concerned individuals. This work would be supported by physical spaces set 
up with the goal of enabling dialogue. For instance, witnesses might appear 
before a couple of randomly assigned symposia, organized in a semi-circle 
and charged with the task of making queries and comments, while the other 
145 or so MCAs viewed the discussion on-screen in the main auditorium. The 
CA would also accept written submissions, which would be posted online 
for anyone to peruse. In addition, members would be allocated time to read 
extensively on the issue at hand from research materials they had gathered 
on their own. All of this work would enable MCAs to produce high-level 
discussions while meeting the objective of deliberation, which is to transform 
off-the-cuff opinions into nuanced, evidence-based arguments.
MCAs would confer with each other at all three levels: seminars, sympo-
sia, and the full assembly. All arguments pro and con would be iterated and 
dissected in an environment of scepticism and respectful cross-examination. 
At the start of these conversations, MCAs might typically hold preconceived 
ideas on an issue; however, as observations and counter-observations were 
made, many would likely rethink their positions, modify them, or go so far 
as to adopt a view diametrically opposed to the one with which they began. 
MCAs would be obliged only to listen to other viewpoints and be open to 
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changing their minds. They should feel no pressure whatsoever to support a 
recommendation they disagreed with. That said, MCAs should always try to 
find common ground, and attempt, through various modifications of a pro-
posal, or even modifications to the question itself, to bring as many members 
as possible on board.
In arriving at a recommendation, the CA would not be expected to achieve 
consensus among all participants. While perhaps an effective way of pro-
ceeding in small, homogeneous groups that rely on “peer pressure, social 
conformism, and a willing acceptance of group norms” (Barber 2003, 149), 
consensus is not viable in free, pluralistic, multicultural societies, where divi-
sions of class, race, and gender – among others – are common. In consensus 
models, dissent can be frowned upon or even actively discouraged. At the 
same time, discussion in a CA would not be a free-for-all, a protracted “talk-
athon” with no end in sight, where the long-winded would be permitted to 
drown out the more soft-spoken. The CA would follow typical parliamentary 
procedures, with reasonable time allocations for speakers, culminating in 
a vote. Before any vote took place, however, all those present should feel 
that the matter had been covered exhaustively. Should members deem that 
a debate was becoming repetitious, it could be halted at any point by one 
member “calling the question” and the assembly deciding to end it. While this 
option would exist, given tight timelines overall and limits on each speaker, 
this procedure – an indication that an issue has been hashed and re-hashed ad 
nauseam – would rarely be invoked.
A CA operating in the manner outlined here would differ from at least one 
British proposal for a “people’s parliament,” which called for a body that 
sits and listens to experts, in the same way a jury listens at a criminal trial 
before casting judgement. In the British proposal, a slightly reformed House 
of Lords, with members appointed for life, would debate issues, while deci-
sions would be made by the people, serving as a jury in a House of Commons, 
whose members have been drawn by lot (Sutherland 2008). This proposal, 
however, negates the major strength of direct democracy – that citizens speak 
directly to each other, and think out loud with each other. MCAs must not be 
passive listeners; they must actively deliberate. In the course of doing so, they 
must be able to articulate arguments both for and against the question at hand.
The conclusions of citizens gathered in a CA of the sort outlined here 
would be vastly superior to the uninformed public opinion gathered in polls, 
which, even with representative samples, cannot accurately gauge the “truth.” 
Truth, after all, finds the light of day only after lengthy study, civil debate, 
and thoughtful reflection. This is the key feature of a CA, the element that 
makes it a unique institution, and gives its recommendations so much value – 
value even in the most basic sense of yielding knowledge that is “worth 
 paying for.”
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND INFLUENCE
After it had concluded its deliberations, the CA would issue a report of about 
twenty-five pages, clearly written and free of jargon, containing balanced 
summaries of the majority and minority viewpoints. Drafted by staff, each 
summary would receive final approval from a committee of ten or so like-
minded MCAs. Combined, they would meet an important goal of democracy, 
namely that the information the public receives on any issue – the informa-
tion that forms the bases of our decision-making – should be “in accord with 
the degree of diversity of opinion within society” (Arblaster 1994, 93). This 
objective cannot be attained via “scientific” polls, open consultation sessions, 
or task forces populated by “experts.” Only a CA can guarantee that “the 
people” have truly spoken.
The CA report could also record the vote tally, and it could note individual 
names for the “yes” and “no” sides. However, since MCAs are not respon-
sible to a group of constituents in the way that Members of Parliament are, 
and because assembly members are a microcosm of society as a whole, in 
effect automatically “reflecting” everyone, a list of names would serve little 
purpose. Indeed, it might be best to maintain a secret ballot so that MCAs do 
not feel pressured to vote for one option over another. Still, a record of votes 
could easily be made part of the report, since the practice is already a com-
mon one, indeed a requirement in elected legislatures.
A CA’s activities would contribute greatly to the education of citizens on 
public policy. In Canada, CA plenary sessions and discussions with expert 
witnesses could be carried by the Cable Public Affairs Channel (CPAC), 
while its reports would be posted online and would hopefully also receive 
extensive media coverage. CA deliberations, final recommendations, and 
reports – with both supporting and dissenting arguments – would form a 
storehouse of knowledge for the media, academics, students, and the general 
public. After perhaps some initial scepticism, the CA’s advice and reasoning 
would demand serious consideration, especially by parliamentarians. A CA 
could wield more influence than may appear possible at first glance given its 
lack of decision-making power, because MPs would find it risky to ignore its 
recommendations, in particular those supported by an overwhelming majority 
of MCAs.
Nevertheless, it would be the government’s prerogative to run counter to 
the CA, though the ruling party no doubt would be pressed to defend such a 
choice in the course of seeking re-election. In doing so, the government may 
well be able to get citizens on side in rejecting a case made by the CA. While 
governments could defy the assembly, over time they might be less inclined 
to do so, especially if the CA becomes a respected moral authority, with the 
citizenry coming to see this new institution as a condensed version of the 
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people themselves. After all, the “more legitimate the process in the minds 
of the public, the more difficult it will be for public officials to ignore the 
recommendations” (Crosby et al. 1986, 173). Any government that frequently 
defied the CA would probably be regarded as arrogant and insensitive, and 
would accordingly face punishment at the ballot box.
Another consequence of the assembly would be to put pressure on the gov-
ernment of the day to address issues that it might otherwise prefer to ignore. 
Given this potential, political parties are more likely to support the CA when 
in opposition, while perhaps disapproving of it when they are in office, 
though there would surely be occasions when this love-hate relationship 
would be reversed. Likewise, ordinary citizens would also find themselves 
on both the winning and losing sides of assembly debates from time to time, 
applauding loudly the recommendations they support while expressing dis-
may at those they dislike. On the whole, if most individuals find themselves 
generally pleased and only occasionally displeased with the CA’s outcomes, 
the assembly could be regarded as doing its job properly.
The recommendations of a CA are unlikely to be either über radical – say, 
wanting to nationalize the banks – or über conservative – for instance, want-
ing to ban abortions. Rather, they should represent in microcosm the views 
generally held by the population. These views would change over time on 
some matters, for example, as older generations die off and are replaced 
by younger ones. On certain issues, a substantial majority would select one 
option over all alternatives. On other issues, the vote would be extremely 
close, which would suggest that society is divided and hence the government 
of the day should proceed with caution.6 One thing is certain, though. CAs 
would have different views on some matters compared to the people who sit 
in elected legislatures, with their disproportionate numbers of older, white, 
and reasonably well-off men. But whatever options MCAs recommend, they 
would express the “general will” of the nation. It would then be up to elected 
governments to decide what happens next.
Given that governments would continue to have the final say, a CA would 
not be in a position to do anything that might warrant adding safeguards 
to make it directly responsible to the public. Its members do not represent 
people “in the sense of acting on behalf of others, except in the very broad 
sense of promoting the general interests of society as a whole” (Brown 2006, 
209). The CA would not need to be accountable to us because it would not 
make decisions, though it would, in its final reports, account for – provide 
reasons for – its recommendations.
In contrast, the citizenry must retain control over government representa-
tives, the men and women who have legislative powers, and hence power over 
our lives, but who, as a rule, differ significantly from most of their fellow 
citizens. This would not be the case with a demographically representative, 
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randomly selected CA. Because an assembly would be beholden to no 
one – political parties, newspaper editorial boards, financial donors, pres-
sure groups – MCAs could recommend what they believe is right, what they 
regard as being in the best interest of their communities and their country.
PARTIES AND LEGISLATURES
It is possible to imagine many MCAs self-identifying with a political party 
and linking up with its formal structures and its MPs in the House of Com-
mons and Senate, while other MCAs would choose to remain “independents,” 
and hence free of the discipline that is enforced by most parties in a parlia-
mentary system. However, this linking of assembly members with parties 
could potentially confuse the role of the MCA with that of the MP. This 
confusion could happen even if MCAs are members of a caucus but allowed 
to vote as they please, free of the “whip,” as this supposed freedom is likely 
to work better in theory than in practice. Even if formally free, MCAs would 
be under enormous pressure to toe the line, and failure to do so could prove 
embarrassing for party leaders who might be perceived as “weak.” Therefore, 
the CA would need to be a “non-political” space, an inappropriate venue for 
“scoring points” and engaging in crass cheerleading on behalf of political par-
ties. Obviously, MCAs in the course of their work would articulate values and 
viewpoints that would be unmistakably “political.” Nevertheless, participants 
should arrive at a tacit agreement to keep their deliberations distinct from 
mainstream party politics.
With this in mind, MCAs should not represent parties either in their com-
ments (“as an NDP supporter, I find that . . .”) or in how they vote; that is, 
they must not be subject to the same discipline faced by MPs. While MCAs 
would be “independent,” they would not be expected to check their ideolo-
gies at the assembly door. Our political perspectives are an integral feature of 
who we are. They help guide us in the choices we make and, while alterable, 
they form a solid core of beliefs, like a religion. We should permit MCAs to 
be card-carrying members of political parties. They could also continue their 
involvement in a party, say as a member of a riding association executive, and 
they could meet and socialize with MPs, but while serving in the assembly 
they would not be permitted to attend party caucus meetings.
In assemblies that have operated to date, non-partisanship seems to be one 
of the features that have contributed to their success. For instance, except for 
a first-day “venting” by some members of the British Columbia CA, for “the 
remainder of the process, the character of the participants’ public dialogue 
and deliberation remained remarkably free of reference to political ideologies 
and positions” (Lang 2007, 43). MCAs would almost certainly not function 
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as unthinking advocates for outside groups, even the ones of which they are 
members. A person’s preferences cannot always be predicted based on the 
social categories they are a part of, or even the political party they regularly 
support. For example, in a study of CAs in Canada and the Netherlands, it 
was found that an assembly member’s support for various electoral system 
options was not affected by whom the MCA usually voted for. Rather, “mem-
bers were genuinely struggling to find the ‘best’ system for their community, 
and whether any option might benefit or hurt any specific party was not a 
relevant consideration” (Fournier et al. 2011, 85). Few of the BC Citizens’ 
Assembly members who were later interviewed “felt that they were there 
to act as representatives of any social group to which they belonged” (Lang 
2007, 54). They saw themselves, first and foremost, as citizens.
As a corollary to their non-partisanship, MCAs would also refrain from 
dealing directly with pressure groups. Individual members of the CA could 
not be lobbied, in the same way that we do not allow members of a jury in 
a criminal trial to be influenced by the family and friends of the accused or 
the victim. Lobbying would be limited to elected members of the House of 
Commons and appointed members of Senate. All attempts to influence the 
assembly would be undertaken in public, in the form of testimony from wit-
nesses, discussions between witnesses and MCAs, and debates among MCAs 
themselves. Furthermore, MCAs could maintain whatever type of public 
profile they desire. They could interact with journalists as they see fit, includ-
ing ignoring them entirely. Eventually, members of the media would develop 
sources among MCAs, just as they do now with members of Parliament, and 
more outspoken MCAs, those willing to have a larger public persona, would 
be sought out by the media as part of its coverage of the assembly’s activities.
Given the strongly independent role of MCAs, how would the assembly 
interact with Parliament? For one, the House of Commons might be required 
to spend a couple of hours considering each advisory report it receives from 
the CA, perhaps half-a-dozen every year. For another, House and Senate 
committees might want to take some time to examine the CA’s recommenda-
tions. If, however, the CA supports an initiative, say to lower the voting age, 
and the government were to agree to move forward with it, it would be up to 
Parliament to design the bill, debate it, and pass it into law.
This chapter has outlined how a Citizens’ Assembly could be organized 
and how it could operate. It needs emphasizing that readers should not be 
upset by any of my detailed recommendations, as little of what is proposed 
herein should be regarded as cast in stone. If an assembly were created, this 
book could perhaps serve as a basic guide to its organization. Once up and 
running, MCAs themselves would carry out self-audits, altering their pro-
cedures via a sub-committee that might issue a series of proposed revisions 
every year or two.
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While I have attempted to sketch out certain facets of a CA, the main focus 
here is on whether having an assembly is a good idea, and not, at the begin-
ning at least, entangling ourselves in the minutiae of how one might work. 
Most aspects of a new CA should be seen as flexible and open to change.7 It 
is hoped that critics will not find one or two elements they dislike in this pro-
posal, declare them to be fatal flaws, and then, with great relief, triumphantly 
announce their support for the status quo.
NOTES
 1. Stratified random sampling “is a randomized selection procedure that ensures 
that statistical proportionality (also called descriptive representation) is achieved 
across demographic dimensions such as locality, age, education, and ethnicity” 
(Lubensky and Carson 2013, 36). So, for example, if a province had twenty MCAs, 
and of the first eighteen chosen, ten were women and eight were men, the last two 
seats would be designated for men to, in this case, ensure gender parity. For an 
example of how a stratified random sample would be undertaken, see Lubensky and 
Carson (2013, 38–41).
 2. For the four Atlantic provinces, given the small percentage of Indigenous 
peoples in their populations, and the small number of “seats” each province would be 
allocated, we should not require that any seats be reserved for persons of Indigenous 
status. For example, PEI would have only two MCAs, alongside a population that is 
just 0.2 per cent Indigenous. This would mean that we could not count on having any 
Indigenous MCAs from Atlantic Canada. In order to rectify this situation, we could 
appoint up to an additional two Indigenous members from the region, if none (or only 
one) is chosen in the random sample, thus giving the region as a whole eighteen or 
nineteen MCAs instead of seventeen.
 3. Any regulations on this matter could be modelled on those used for parental leaves.
 4. At some point, the CA might run out of issues to discuss, but this is likely only 
if the House of Commons does so as well.
 5. I emphasize could; the CA might decide not to revisit an issue, even if the 
minimum “wait time” had elapsed.
 6. It would be especially important in close votes to have a mechanism like an 
assembly that could accurately discern why citizens voted as they did.
 7. Hennig et al. (2017) make a brief case for a permanent citizens’ assembly as 
a second chamber in the Scottish Parliament. Their recommendations have much in 
common with mine but also much that is different. We are in agreement, though, that 






In 2011–2012, university students in Quebec engaged in a long series of pro-
tests, some involving hundreds of thousands of people, against a provincial 
government proposal to roughly double tuition over the course of a few years. 
In a number of instances, students and police engaged in confrontations; thou-
sands of students were arrested. The government even passed legislation that 
tried to ban the protests, to little avail. All it ended up doing was provoking 
civil disobedience while giving the impression that it was trampling on free-
dom of expression. The government and students remained, for the most part, 
at loggerheads until the Liberal Party was defeated in the election of Septem-
ber 2012. This incident contributed to the impression, no doubt among youth 
especially, that governments do not listen to the concerns of everyday people.
The previous chapter outlined how a national Citizens’ Assembly of Can-
ada might work. There is no reason, however, to restrict CAs to the federal 
level. Events like the Quebec student protests demonstrate that assemblies 
could serve useful purposes in all provinces and territories. The size of each 
of these CAs would depend somewhat on each geographic area’s total popu-
lation. In larger provinces, CAs of about 120 people might be sufficient. For 
the smaller provinces, eighty would likely be a suitable number; anything 
less would make it difficult to meet the need for representativeness. The time 
commitments of these MCAs would perhaps amount to one-quarter to three-
quarters of those of their federal counterparts.
CAs would also prove useful at the municipal level, especially given that 
local issues can often raise NIMBY (“Not in My Back Yard!”) emotions to 
a fever pitch. There recently was a burning, NIMBY-type controversy where 
I live, in North Bay, Ontario. It involved the question of whether to allow a 
casino into the community and, even more contentiously, whether to build 
it on a vacant lot next to the waterfront. Once the proposal started to gain 
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traction, a group rapidly organized a Facebook page to oppose, most notably, 
the waterfront as a potential location. This tactic was quickly followed with 
the appearance of a pro-casino group, who launched their own Facebook 
page. Some news agencies conducted online polls to gauge support for each 
side in the debate. A few days later, opponents of the casino “packed” council 
chambers and spent more than two hours addressing the city’s Planning Advi-
sory Committee. City staff prepared a report for council, which ultimately 
decided to give permission for the construction of a casino, but recommended 
that it be built on the outskirts of the city. Council gave final approval for 
the project in December 2018. This issue, and many more like it, would be 
perfectly suitable for a CA to consider, and doing so would enable elected 
councils to take accurate readings of the “temperature” of their populations. 
Compared to duelling Facebook pages, and unreliable and unrepresentative 
polls, municipal CAs could give councils solid grounding for their decisions.
There was one recent case where a municipal government did just this; the 
first such CA in Canada. In the 1990s, in Prince Edward County, Ontario, 
a number of different municipalities were amalgamated into one governing 
body. In the early 2000s, the county council began to grapple with the ques-
tion of its size, which was a “hot potato” issue for politicians and citizens 
alike. In 2013, the council convened a CA of twenty-three residents, selected 
at random, to tackle the matter. They met on three Saturdays over a period 
of about a month. First, the members agreed unanimously to not increase the 
number of councillors above the then total of fifteen. After settling that ques-
tion, nineteen of twenty-three MCAs recommended reducing the number of 
councillors to ten, while four supported a council of fourteen (PECCA 2013).
The CA, while it did not deal with the issue of ward divisions at length, 
suggested that, given a recommendation of ten councillors, the county have 
either two wards of five councillors or five wards of two councillors. Their 
rationale was that one ward (all ten councillors elected by all voters) was 
unfair because it made campaigning difficult and would favour higher-
income candidates. They also rejected ten wards with one councillor each, 
which they felt would contribute to NIMBYism. In the end, the council 
rejected the recommendation of the assembly. In January 2016, the county 
passed a bylaw that created nine wards based on the boundaries of the for-
mer independent municipalities, producing jurisdictions of vastly differing 
numbers of citizens, ranging from 5 per cent of the total population up to 
24 per cent. The larger wards were given two or three council seats while the 
smaller wards received one, for a total of thirteen, plus a mayor elected at 
large. Because of perceived drawbacks to this system, in March 2016, some 
citizens in the county appealed the bylaw to the Ontario Municipal Board. In 
December 2017, the Board dismissed the appeal, finding “no reason to inter-
fere with the decision made by County Council.”
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What happened in Prince Edward County is just one example of how urban 
areas could proceed, free to pick from a variety of CA options. Large cities 
like Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver could model their CAs, in terms of 
workload and salary, on provinces like Alberta, while mid-sized cities like 
Ottawa, Calgary, and Edmonton might trim their CAs down even further. 
There would come a point in smaller centres such as Quebec and Hamilton 
where membership in a CA would constitute more of a part-time job, with 
meetings held only occasionally. If this were the case, a rotating membership 
might work best; a group of people who could gather for four or five week-
ends over a period of two or three months to study particular issues.
In these cases, the local government might establish the “shell” of an 
assembly to enable a “rapid response,” quickly bringing together the neces-
sary participants, both members and staff, with the latter perhaps seconded 
from other positions within the civil service. The government and its citizens 
would eventually get used to the fact that the assembly might be called into 
action a handful of times each year, as politicians take seriously their respon-
sibility to gather representative feedback from the people on critical issues. 
Citizens could follow any assembly they were interested in, including receiv-
ing email notifications a few times a year, whenever an assembly was about 
to embark on the examination of a question.
Examples of CAs worldwide demonstrate that we can “mix and match” the 
ways we construct them in order to get the required job done while keeping 
costs at a reasonable level. Assemblies can be large or small, with members 
serving on a full-time or a part-time basis. MCAs can be paid an annual sal-
ary, a pro-rated salary, a per diem stipend, or nothing at all if the time served 
is brief. Governments and policymakers can experiment with CAs, up-scaling 
or downsizing them as they see fit. There is no shortage of permutations and 
combinations. For example, the CAs discussed so far have subsisted under 
geographic umbrellas (federal, provincial, and municipal). However, we might 
want to organize some of our “part-time” CAs by policy issues. Health care 
is one area that could benefit greatly from the advice of an assembly. It is no 
secret that health care costs – or at least some aspects of these costs, like pre-
scription drugs – have been increasing much more rapidly than inflation over 
the past couple of decades. Given this, a CA might be tasked with specific 
questions within the field, such as: Should we have a national drug benefit 
programme? If we had such a programme, which classes of drugs would be 
covered? How much revenue would the federal government and the provinces/
territories each contribute to the programme? And so forth. To reduce travel 
expenses, members of these assemblies could meet in person infrequently, 
spending more of their time “together” via new technologies such as Skype.1
But why stop there? CAs could be used by school boards and district health 
councils. Some variant of a CA could, and should, be a requirement for all 
42 Chapter 3
federal crown corporations, including Canada Post, Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; provincial 
crown corporations where they exist, in areas such as hydro, telecoms, liquor 
control boards, and public insurance; major municipal services, such as trans-
portation, water, and recreation; and government regulators at all levels. In 
sum, there are countless public and quasi-public institutions that could benefit 
from the policy innovations and thoughtful feedback that CAs can provide on 
a whole host of issues.
NOTE
 1. In terms of facilitating deliberations, an online meeting should always be seen 
as a second-best option compared to face-to-face discussions.
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Critics of the People
Most of us, from time to time, have no doubt nodded in agreement with Sir 
Winston Churchill’s musing that the “biggest argument against democracy 
is a five-minute discussion with the average voter” (quoted in Fournier et al. 
2011, 2). This is especially so when we find ourselves, as we invariably do, 
on the losing end of a vote, which we feel only happened because the other 
side consisted of a collection of hard-headed, unenlightened individuals. For 
sure, it is not difficult to find low levels of knowledge on a variety of issues 
among the general public. For instance, “at the height of the Cold War, half 
of all Americans thought the Soviet Union was a member of NATO” (Suther-
land 2008, 79). Many may well wonder whether these “political illiterates” 
could be effective participants in a CA. This is particularly the case if, as 
one critic has suggested, a CA included a number of individuals like “Old 
Gertie, the bag lady, who sees every issue as still another example of how 
the Communists are poisoning the drinking water with fluoride as part of the 
conspiracy to drive her crazy and cheat her of her rightful place as queen of 
Rumania” (Malcolm Margolin, cited in Callenbach and Phillips 2008, 81). 
Furthermore, ordinary citizens often appear to be incapable of treating each 
other with respect, judging from the comments sections of online newspa-
pers, which can be filled with verbal attacks, offensive language, rudeness, 
and sarcasm. Too many people seem to be anti-intellectual, married to their 
own opinions, easily manipulated, close-minded, obstinate, and racist. A CA 
might end up looking like an extended episode of the old Jerry Springer 
Show, with fists flying in all directions.
Some critics have, therefore, concluded that most people do not have the 
intellectual capacity to participate in political life; the goal of public delibera-
tion runs “afoul of the reality of widespread voter ignorance and irrational-
ity” (Somin 2010, 253–54). Ordinary individuals would just make a mess of 
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things. Moreover, many issues are complex, and most people do not have the 
backgrounds necessary to cast judgement on them. These individuals might 
have something useful to say if they were selected “to become full-time 
deliberators,” but regardless of the information presented to even permanent 
members of CAs, “deliberators are still likely to evaluate that information in 
ways that are biased and often illogical” (Somin 2010, 268–69).
This “intelligence critique” of CAs comes in a number of forms. One form 
suggests that “the masses” lack the ability to think in a sophisticated manner. 
For instance, some critics claim that what we might call the “theoretical bar” 
is simply too high for most humans to jump over. Complex policy delibera-
tion “requires a substantial degree of understanding of moral and philosophi-
cal arguments,” and yet it “seems unlikely that most voters have more than 
a very limited understanding of philosophy, logic, and moral theory” (Somin 
2010, 254, 259). Another form argues that ordinary people cannot sufficiently 
grasp technical details in areas critical to governance, such as military pro-
curement, pipeline projects, and free trade agreements. Redekop (2005) made 
this argument about the average men and women who populated the British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform. He took issue with what 
he saw as this CA’s “central populist belief,” namely that political decision-
making “will be more satisfactory if undertaken by mostly uninformed mem-
bers of the public rather than by knowledgeable experts,” a belief that rested 
on the assumption that “knowledge, experience, and expertise are irrelevant 
if not disadvantageous.” The fact that this CA had to bring in experts on 
electoral systems to educate members, he says, “indicates that the populist 
faith in the decision-making capacity of untrained and uninitiated common 
folk may not be warranted” (91, 94). In contrast, Redekop made the case for 
governance by professionals:
Who would argue, for example, that when a bus driver discovers that her 
vehicle is not functioning properly, she should ignore trained and experienced 
mechanics and let untrained common folk, who do not possess any expertise in 
the area, try to undertake corrective action? To pose the question is to indicate 
how illogical such a stance would be. Similarly, let us consider the matter of 
illness. While acknowledging that certain home remedies and practices, rooted 
in generations of experience, can be of some value, who of us, if suffering from 
a serious malady, would argue that it is better to consult with untrained ordi-
nary folk and follow their recommendations than to see a trained and licensed 
physician?
. . . Again, the answer is obvious. Useful comments may come from many 
sources; reliable expertise and tested insights come from experts. (92)
Our critic further posited that there is no evidence that “common folk” are 
“more moral or more astute than are other people or that they make wiser 
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political decisions”; these citizens, he added, do not possess “unique morality 
or insight” (91).
Here Redekop has advanced a “straw man” argument, a simplistic view of 
the very kind critics attribute to their opponents (advocates for an assembly) 
to try to make their ideas sound foolish. Yet no one is arguing that ordinary 
people are smarter, more ethical, or would make inherently better judgements 
than others, and no one is suggesting that expertise is irrelevant. Furthermore, 
the notion that having knowledge is “disadvantageous” is a claim that no 
rational person would make. Beating a straw man is a fundamentally unfair 
way of debating, as it does not give any credence to the ideas of those making 
a different case – and a very reasonable one at that.
Critics like Somin and Redekop are not hard to find. They provide evi-
dence that our culture still contains elements of a tenacious, “Churchillian” 
fear of ordinary people – a fear that if the “lowbrows” are in charge ghastly 
things are bound to happen. But, I ask, ghastly compared to what? The con-
sequences of democracy as it currently operates? Would “the people” make 
decisions worse than those that determined the treatment meted out to Indig-
enous Canadians over the 140 years or so since the passage of the Indian Act? 
Or, using a more global lens, worse than, say, the decision to deny basic civil 
rights to African Americans for at least a century after the formal abolition 
of slavery? Worse than World Wars I and II or the Holocaust? And if we 
believe those evils could not be replicated today, we might ask, would the 
people make decisions worse than the recent one to go to war with Iraq, a 
war now almost universally regarded as a catastrophe? Or perhaps we should 
consider more mundane decisions than this catalogue of failures. What about 
the countless times governments throughout the world, including in Canada, 
are found by their courts to have abrogated the rights of their citizens? Can 
we truly expect the decisions of “the people” to generate effects worse than 
these, especially if the role of CAs is limited to granting advice to legislators?
Our representatives, both elected and appointed, cannot make any claim to 
being wiser than a substantial majority of people. They do not have a clearer 
road map than we do, one with a more expeditious route towards the public 
good. Still, critics will have a number of questions: Would discussions in a 
CA always be thoughtful? My response is “perhaps not,” but are they always 
thoughtful in Parliament? Would some people in a CA dominate debate? 
Given the rules of procedure in each institution, a “domination” scenario 
is much more likely to unfold in Parliament, especially one with a majority 
government, than in the kind of CA outlined above. Should we be afraid of 
“group think” in a CA? I don’t believe so, given the wide variety of perspec-
tives that would exist in any assembly. In contrast, is there not a tendency 
for MPs in all political parties to march in lock-step, because they have to be 
cognizant of the sting of their parties’ “whips” should they dissent? In short, 
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a CA should not be dismissed simply because critics can expound a collection 
of “bogeyman” scenarios.
What these critics prefer is a government in which experts – society’s 
elites – think and decide on behalf of the rest. They assume that having 
immense technical knowledge, perhaps alongside an advanced degree in 
political theory, is a prerequisite for decision-making on public issues. This 
perspective intimates that the problem with ordinary people is their ordinari-
ness. There are certainly times in life when we need the assistance of indi-
viduals with “scientific” skills, and many of these skills take some effort to 
master. For instance, barbers must be deft with scissors, and doctors must be 
able to operate the tools of their trade.
In contrast to what we might call “elite knowledge,” what citizens require 
to make recommendations (or decisions) is something else, a form of general 
moral knowledge, notably understanding the difference between right and 
wrong, and general intellectual capabilities such as reading, distinguish-
ing strong arguments from weak ones, asking pertinent questions, and so 
forth. Politicians (and assembly members) therefore require a skillset that 
is possessed by an overwhelming majority of adult citizens. One does not 
have to be capable of writing a treatise on political thought to, for example, 
understand the tragic consequences of drunk drivers and to recommend 
appropriate punishments for their actions; or to discern the pros and cons 
of legalizing marijuana; or to decide, as the Irish Constitutional Convention 
did, that gay people should be allowed to legally marry. We are fully capable 
of understanding that every decision has trade-offs, and that every decision 
incurs opportunity costs. Surely we, with universal education, should have 
no trouble accepting the idea that a preponderance of the citizenry – millions 
of people – are able to participate in these types of discussions, and hence 
become more actively involved in their democracies. If people aged eighteen 
and over are deemed fully qualified to cast ballots, in effect determining 
the overall fate of the nation, then they should be qualified to decide – or 
at least make recommendations – on complex matters. With their varied 
backgrounds, experiences, and levels of knowledge, MCAs would, as a 
group, be able to make judgements that maximize the intellectual capabili-
ties dispersed throughout society. In any assembly, with dozens of speakers 
on both sides of every issue, the “truth,” as best we can discover it, would 
eventually emerge.
Unless proof can be ascertained otherwise, we should assume that MCAs 
could debate and discuss issues, and learn to some degree specialized and 
technical vocabularies, at least as well as members of the House of Com-
mons. MPs, as a collective, are not necessarily more intelligent than a ran-
domly chosen group of citizens. Few MPs at the point of first election have 
substantially more knowledge than average citizens on the vast cornucopia 
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of public policies, including agriculture, energy, natural resources, health, 
labour, fisheries, industry, First Nations, international affairs, sport, and so 
on. Nevertheless, as soon as they take their seats in Parliament, MPs vote 
frequently on all these issues, and typically the way they have been told to 
by their party’s brass.
What has happened, in practice, when ordinary people have been asked 
for their advice on complicated matters, when ordinary people first take their 
seats? In one instance, observers of an Australian citizens’ jury on recycling 
found that “discussions and recommendations were thoughtful, reasoned, and 
caring, with participants demonstrating a willingness to consider public needs 
over their own self interest” (Carson and Martin 2002, 109). Over a two-day 
period, this eleven-person jury
wrestled with options and problems and strengths and weaknesses of various 
issues. They called for more information and demanded clarification when 
confusion arose. They prioritised their ideas and then worked on their recom-
mendations via a projected computer screen. They discussed every recommen-
dation in minute detail until they were satisfied their opinions were accurately 
captured. They resisted unnecessary haste and produced a report of which they 
were proud. (109)
In another case, an American citizens’ jury on health care reform showed 
that “once educated and provided with the opportunity at deliberation, public 
opinion is capable of moving through the implications of difficult and often 
highly technical issues” (Button and Mattson 1999, 622). Commenting on 
the Australian Citizens’ Parliament, Dryzek et al. (2009, 3) note that while 
its recommendations were significant, “what is equally important is the dem-
onstration of the sophistication with which ordinary citizens can, if given 
the opportunity, handle complex political questions.” Based on their obser-
vations of three assemblies on electoral reform, Fournier et al. (2011, 39) 
concluded that “it was hard not to be impressed with the capacity of citizens 
to learn, absorb, and understand the intricacies of a subject to which most 
had given little, if any, prior thought.” They added: “Not only are ordinary 
people able to learn about a difficult policy issue, as they do so their opinions 
of the current situation and potential alternatives change in consequence” 
(78). Finally, the Melbourne People’s Panel, mentioned in chapter 1, also 
demonstrated that “the public is very smart, if given the time and information 
necessary to work through an issue. The panel members showed themselves 
to be unencumbered by the entrenched positions of political parties and the 
powerful lobbying efforts of vested interests on issues such as developer 
contributions”1 (Reece 2015). When it comes to deliberation, then, practical 
experience seems to show that everyday citizens are more than capable of 
rising to the challenge.
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A further criticism of “the people” is that most issues are too intellectually 
demanding, so much so that ordinary folk would not be able to work their 
way through the maze of complications and come to terms with the variety 
of options available. Encountering a barrage of “forks in the road,” MCAs 
would experience a form of paralysis, and would be unable to act. Critics usu-
ally frame this criticism as a series of apparently disturbing and, ultimately, 
unanswerable questions, which have the effect of suggesting that we should 
scrap any notion of involving in politics those who would wilt under the pres-
sure of mental taxation. The following is one example of the genre:
Consider, for example, the possibility of structured public deliberation over 
health-care policy. Which experts, political parties, and interest groups should 
be allowed to make presentations to the deliberators? Should interest groups 
representing doctors, nurses, insurance companies, hospital administrators, 
medical researchers, or many other conceivable parties be among them? What 
about policy experts such as health-care economists, sociologists, and public-
health specialists? Which policy options should the deliberators consider, other 
than the status quo? Should they include a single-payer system, “managed” 
care, market-based medical provision, and hybrid systems such as Singapore’s? 
Other potential models such as Canada, Britain, and France – all of which dif-
fer substantially from each other – could also potentially be considered. (Somin 
2010, 269)
Such a list of questions should not concern us in the least, because a CA 
would answer each one in exactly the same way as a parliamentary inquiry 
into the issue would. And then a CA charged with addressing health care 
policy would do what all CAs have done – members would begin by deter-
mining and agreeing on the criteria for evaluating the options; they would 
whittle down the options to perhaps two or three; they would assess the 
options based on their criteria; and then a single option would emerge as the 
favoured one. The majority supporting the option would try to convince as 
many MCAs as possible to get on board with the recommendation, while 
at the same time respecting the minority, dissenting viewpoints that would 
undoubtedly remain. The recommendation would then be placed in the hands 
of government, which would be free to act on it or not.
Even if we acknowledge that quite a number of individuals are able to 
deliberate, some critics still maintain that “the people” as a whole cannot do 
so while they are embedded in a society that does not have anything resem-
bling social and economic equality. These inequalities are seen as fatal to any 
attempt to enhance direct forms of democracy. Commenting on the American 
case, Sanders (1997, 348) posited that some “citizens are better than others 
at articulating their arguments in rational, reasonable terms.” She assumes 
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that those least able to engage in deliberations are likely to be those “who are 
systematically materially disadvantaged, namely women; racial minorities, 
especially Blacks; and poorer people” (349). The implication of this view is 
that now is not the time to proceed with deliberative experiments, because 
those who are shy and alienated may not speak up. They will remain almost 
mute, dragged down by the class, race, and gender “baggage” society imposes 
upon them.
But is this an accurate assessment of what might happen, or is it a ste-
reotype? In the case of a group of Americans brought together to deliberate 
on questions of health and education, “by far the most talking (measured in 
number of words used) was done by non-white, less educated females, with 
non-white higher educated females close behind. The least number of words 
were actually expressed by white, higher-educated males.” This research 
demonstrated that “there is no substantial pattern of inequalities distorting 
the deliberative process in the way that deliberation critics suppose” (Fish-
kin 2009, 130, 131). Meanwhile, the conversational record of the Australian 
Citizens’ Parliament “revealed women to be at least as dominant and forceful 
as the men” (Lubensky and Carson 2013, 45). In another study of CAs on 
electoral reform, the authors concluded that with “no trace of an educational 
cleavage at any point in time, we have no reason to believe that the better 
educated led their group in any particular direction” (Fournier et al. 2011, 
100–101).
It is possible that those with higher levels of “social capital” will speak 
more in settings such as town halls, where everyone is invited to participate, 
and the “smart” ones might indeed dominate (though we should not overstate 
by how much). However, a CA differs significantly from this type of forum in 
its membership; the CA is representative while a town hall is potentially full 
of “axe-grinders.” Moreover, there is a critical contrast between the two in 
the processes through which deliberation takes place. An assembly is highly 
structured, while in a town hall seats may be filled by aggressive people with 
big mouths who can shout others down.
It is true that we live in an era of high inequality. At the same time, edu-
cation levels are setting new records. For instance, four out of every five 
students now graduate from high school in the province of Ontario, with 
many of these individuals pursuing and completing post-secondary studies. 
Most of the people who quit school before, say, Grade 10 are currently over 
age fifty, yet many of them have substantial life experiences they can draw 
on. These experiences more than make up for some deficiencies in their 
formal education, the return on which surely diminishes once we go beyond 
high school, the point at which the learning curve that rises exponentially 
from kindergarten onwards starts to flatten out. There would be instances 
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as well when holding academic credentials would not be especially useful. 
For example, an individual with a PhD in accounting would almost certainly 
contribute less to a discussion of First Nations’ water supplies than an Indig-
enous elder with little formal schooling. It would also be a mistake to assume 
that those with advanced degrees would be more articulate and self-confident 
than other MCAs. In short, we should not exaggerate the negative effects of 
social inequalities on the ability of people from all walks of life to participate.
While the CA outlined earlier would produce a significant enhancement of 
our democracy, given the potential for criticism we should be under no illu-
sion that this proposal would receive anything close to unanimous support. 
For what might happen, we can look to Australia where, during the 2010 
election campaign, Prime Minister Julia Gillard promised that if re-elected, 
her party would create a 150-person CA to study the issue of climate change, 
which would run for about a year and address what is perhaps the great-
est crisis facing humanity. The proposal was quietly dropped after intense 
criticism. Media commentators described the idea as “pathetic,” “absurd,” 
“ridiculous,” and “wacky,” nothing more than a potential “gabfest” (quoted 
in Boswell et al. 2013, 165–70). The government was seen as engineering a 
“cop-out,” incapable of taking an effective position on a critically important 
issue, and instead devolving its responsibility to lead and make decisions to 
an unelected CA. Critics also saw the issue as too complex for ordinary citi-
zens to handle. Even some environmentalists (who usually hug democracy, as 
well as trees) opposed the CA on these grounds, denigrating it as a “populist 
strategy,” a public relations gimmick. Some politicians criticized what they 
saw as duplication, arguing that “we already have a Citizens’ Assembly – it’s 
called Parliament.”
We can get a further inkling of how legislators might react to the forma-
tion of a CA by examining a recent experiment in Scotland. In 1995, the 
Scottish Civic Assembly was founded with the goal of enhancing public 
deliberation. It consisted of representatives from various stakeholders, such 
as businesses, unions, and charities. In 1999, the UK government devolved 
some of its powers to a new Scottish Parliament. As part of this process, 
the assembly’s name changed to the Scottish Civic Forum. At this point, 
the forum’s role evolved into undertaking public consultations for the new 
Parliament. Hence, the forum no longer set its own agenda, and it ceased to 
be an independent body.
It did not take long for Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) to view 
the forum as a competitor, another site of influence that reduced in some ways 
the power of elected MSPs. They accused the forum of duplicating their work 
rather than supplementing it. They maintained that concerned citizens were 
supposed to talk to them, their individual MSPs, and not to some “forum” 
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outside the walls of Parliament. MSPs, then, saw the forum as a threat, so 
they stood in its way. These MSPs help us to answer a question posed by 
Davidson et al. (2011, 379): “Why is it that the rhetoric of deliberative 
democracy is widespread, yet the facilitating institutional landscape remains 
relatively barren?” This landscape became even more desolate in 2005 when 
the forum’s funding was withdrawn by a hostile government, thus putting an 
end to Scotland’s deliberative experiment. Parliament did undertake substan-
tially improved consultation on a host of issues after the demise of the forum, 
but within half-a-decade political decision-makers had returned to their old, 
familiar ways of limiting public input to the usual suspects, and having that 
input directed by MSPs.
Despite the various fears of some politicians, academics, and media pun-
dits, however, CAs have invariably produced thoughtful and competently 
derived outcomes both in Canada and abroad. Two Australian observers said 
that their nation’s 2009 Citizens’ Parliament “put to the test all the commonly 
held assumptions about the ability and willingness of ‘ordinary citizens’ to 
demonstrate their fitness for democratic self-rule” (Hartz-Karp and Carson 
2009, 19). And it appears that in this instance, and everywhere else CAs have 
been used, “ordinary citizens” have passed this test with flying colours. The 
conceit that “the masses” should not participate because they are ignorant, 
and hence have no business in public life, is simply the same elitist prejudice 
that has been applied in virulent forms for centuries – and in some places, is 
still being applied – to groups such as women, Indigenous peoples, and racial 
minorities. It is long past time to put this prejudice to rest.
The contention that an assembly would contribute little more than ill-
informed commentaries from hapless know-nothings seems to be put 
forward, in the main, by political theorists who work in the rarefied air of 
abstract speculation. Meanwhile, those who have dared to venture into CAs, 
carefully watching participants in action, have come to a different conclusion. 
Their observations confirm that we should not fear the ideas that percolate 
up from the public; rather, we should embrace them. Creating an assembly 
would not require a daunting leap of faith on our part. We can take comfort in 
the significant amounts of research on CAs, which Fiach Mac Conghail, the 
chair of Ireland’s “We the Citizens” CA, summed up as follows: “We now 
have unequivocal proof that citizens’ assemblies will work in this country, as 
they have in many others” (WTC 2011, 4). We can, without doubt, say the 
same thing for Canada.
Critiques of the intellectual capabilities of citizens are used as a shield by 
elites, who often are loath to relinquish their “leadership” of society. Leg-
islators, in particular, believe that they should be the only ones who tackle 
our problems; after all, they say, that’s why they were elected. A CA, then, 
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would create grumbling among some members of the political class, because 
it would mean that they would lose partial control of the agenda, yet even 
this limited loss, especially for some MPs, would be too much to bear. At the 
same time, a CA could help MPs do their jobs more effectively. Politicians 
might have more to gain from an assembly than they would have to lose, a 
topic to which we now turn.
NOTE
 1. Developer contributions are payments made by a private company to a city 
council if the company’s development creates the need for more public infrastructure, 




Even if the main objections to CAs have little merit, CAs are still open to 
the allegation that they would be too expensive and not worth the financial 
outlay. It might be suggested that in an era of near-constant government 
deficits, with so many unmet needs in our society, we cannot possibly justify 
choosing to fund an assembly over social, health, and education programmes. 
In this chapter, in the course of four brief case studies, I submit that the price 
tag of any CA would be more than offset by the substantial benefits received 
in return.
Let’s begin by calculating the cost of a Citizens’ Assembly of Canada. 
Let’s assume that MCAs would receive the same pay as members of the Sen-
ate, about $145,000 per year, and receive benefits such as life and disability 
insurance, extended health care, child care, pension contributions, and so 
on, though they would not be paid for unexplained absences. These benefits 
might add 30 per cent to the cost of an MCA, bringing the total for each one 
to $189,000. For 172 MCAs, this would result in an overall expenditure of 
$32.5 million per year. Because MCAs have no constituency obligations, 
they would not require office workers in Ottawa or back home in their (non-
existent) ridings.
The CA itself would need to hire personnel such as librarians, researchers, 
writers, translators, group facilitators, and administrators. There would also 
be overhead costs, such as rent, hydro, office furniture, supplies, and reloca-
tion expenses. To account for these, let’s take our $32.5 million figure and 
multiply it by two-and-a-half. This would produce a grand total of $81 mil-
lion annually. That amount was equivalent to 0.03 per cent of federal govern-
ment expenditures in 2016–2017, which were $250 billion. It works out to 
$2.30 per Canadian, per year – a bargain-basement price – roughly the cost 
of an extra-large cup of coffee at Tim Hortons.
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While a CA would have to be paid for, its work would bring significant 
financial, economic, social, and political returns. This would especially be the 
case if it could help us avoid policy errors or, in worst-case scenarios, policy 
disasters. Such mistakes happen for many reasons, but especially because 
“decision-makers systematically choose to ignore an abundance of critical or 
warning voices in order to persevere with their chosen policy.” What some-
times happens is that “an elite group of highly motivated decision-makers – 
insulated from challenge, disposing of great political and administrative 
power, and intellectually convinced of their own abilities, determination, 
and direction – progressively cut themselves off from information tending to 
undermine group morale, pushing through decisions” (Dunleavy 1995, 52).1 
The rest of this chapter focuses on four such disasters (or near-disasters) of 
one type or another, which have all produced negative (or potentially nega-
tive) consequences.
QUEBEC’S CHARTER OF VALUES
First, let’s look at an example of a “near-social disaster,” one that was cer-
tainly a political disaster, which occurred over the last few years in Quebec. 
In the province’s 2012 election, the Parti Québecois (PQ) won a minority 
government. In October 2013, in an attempt to deal with a long-standing issue 
regarding the “reasonable accommodation” of the cultural views and prac-
tices of, for the most part, religious minorities, the government introduced a 
bill popularly known as the “Charter of Values.” Perhaps the most controver-
sial aspect of the Charter was a proposal to ban public-sector workers from 
wearing “conspicuous” religious symbols, like hijabs and turbans.
Despite not having a majority in the National Assembly, the government 
pushed ahead with its proposal, likely because polls showed that the Charter 
was initially popular, specifically among the francophone, Christian major-
ity. However, over time, numerous groups and individuals came out against 
it, including the Quebec Human Rights Commission, the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, all three major federal political parties, and even three 
former PQ premiers. Some schools and hospitals said they would defy the 
Charter if it became law. Many universities, both English and French, con-
demned the bill. The Charter provoked protest marches, with many claiming 
it was out-and-out racist.
The government pressed ahead despite the growing opposition, and despite 
the assertion by numerous observers that the law had no chance of surviv-
ing a court challenge. In March 2014, Premier Pauline Marois gambled and 
called a snap election with the Charter featuring as one of the main issues of 
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the campaign. When the results were in, the Liberal Party, which had been 
defeated in September 2012 after nine years in power, was returned with a 
majority. The PQ suffered a humiliating defeat, receiving its lowest share of 
the popular vote (25 per cent) since 1970, almost half-a-century earlier. The 
premier’s gamble had failed spectacularly.
The issue of “religious accommodation” did not end with the election of 
the Liberals, however. In 2015, they tabled Bill 62, the “religious neutral-
ity bill,” which did not go as far as the Charter of Values, but proposed to 
ban face-coverings such as the niqab (though not other types of religious 
headgear) for civil servants delivering services as well as for citizens receiv-
ing services. Given that Muslim women would be one of the few groups in 
society, and perhaps the only group, targeted by this legislation, it was criti-
cized as violating human rights. Nevertheless, the province, with the general 
support of all four parties in the National Assembly, moved the bill forward. 
Even the murder of six Muslim men at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec 
City in January 2017 did not give legislators pause. The reason for this was 
highlighted in an Angus Reid public opinion poll released in October 2017, 
just as Bill 62 was moving through committee stage at the National Assem-
bly. The poll showed that the bill had overwhelming support throughout the 
province, with 62 per cent saying they “strongly supported” the proposed leg-
islation and another 25 per cent giving “moderate” support. The bill became 
law shortly thereafter, and some groups, including the National Council of 
Canadian Muslims and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, almost 
immediately launched a court challenge.
How might things have unfolded if Quebec had had a CA? As noted, an 
assembly would be a thorn in the side of governments from time to time. 
Conversely, it could also keep alive a government that might otherwise be 
taken down by a combination of its own hubris and ill-conceived risk-taking. 
In this case, the government might have asked a CA whether a Charter of 
Values was needed, and if the answer to that question was “yes,” the gov-
ernment could have further asked the assembly: “What should that Charter 
look like?” This would have created the opportunity for an open, respectful 
conversation, with the CA presenting its recommendations to the legisla-
ture and, at the same time, to the citizenry. As it was, the Charter appears 
to have begun as an exercise driven by a handful of hard line politicians, 
announced to the general public via a media “leak” to a major daily newspa-
per. In the end, the governing party not only failed to achieve its objective, 
it was brought into a state of tumult in the process. The PQ might still be 
in power if there had been a CA to help save it from itself.2 Furthermore, 
Quebeckers could benefit from a CA that would help ascertain the level of 
opposition to the law, while addressing the criticisms that are still gnawing 
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at it, criticisms which will continue in the form of extended, and expensive, 
court challenges.3
CANADA’S PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT
As a second case study, let’s look at an example of what might be called a 
“near-financial disaster.” In July 2010, then Defence Minister Peter Mackay 
announced that Canada’s military was purchasing a number of F-35 Light-
ning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. The government was prepared to do so 
without an open bidding process, which, had one been employed, may have 
allowed it not only to get a better price for any planes purchased, but also to 
maximize the economic benefits to Canada in the course of their production. 
The original cost of the F-35s was estimated to be $9 billion for purchase and 
$7 billion for maintenance over the life of the aircraft ($16 billion in total). 
In May 2011, however, the Parliamentary Budget Office came out with a 
total estimate of $30 billion. By the end of 2011, based on revised figures 
from the Pentagon, the estimate had risen again, this time to $35 billion. 
The main reason for these increases was that early projected costs had been 
based on different assumptions about the lifespan of the planes, and hence the 
number of years they would require repairs. The average annual cost of the 
planes remained unchanged under all the reported scenarios, at about $1 bil-
lion. However, the impression given to the public by each new estimate was 
that expenditures were spiralling out of control, and might not yet have hit a 
ceiling.
The government, however, stuck to its plan to purchase the F-35, and the 
majority the Conservative Party won in the federal election of 2011 should 
have guaranteed that it would go ahead. Then, in April 2012, the Auditor-
General’s report castigated the Department of National Defence (DND), 
saying it had not been forthcoming with pertinent information to the federal 
cabinet, the ultimate decision-makers. The government responded by remov-
ing the procurement process from DND, transferring it to Public Works and 
Government Services Canada. As time went on, this long-running soap opera 
became an embarrassment for the Conservatives. As a result, in Decem-
ber 2012, they called for a “reset,” basically starting the whole procurement 
process again from scratch. They appointed a four-member “panel of inde-
pendent monitors,” and in June 2014 this panel confirmed the assessment 
DND had previously made of four different models of planes considered 
potentially suitable. The recommendations of this panel, however, like pre-
vious recommendations, came under criticism. One media report noted that 
“Al Williams, the former head of procurement at the Department of National 
Defence, who oversaw Canada’s initial involvement in the F-35 programme, 
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has dismissed the current process as a government public relations ploy. He 
argues that a competition, where all candidate jets are properly evaluated, is 
the only way to proceed” (Pugliese 2014).
The F-35 acquisition process highlights a failure of democratic account-
ability, particularly the lack of political oversight of DND. The consequences 
are not surprising: “Left unconstrained, a bureaucracy seeking a particular 
outcome will always do what DND did in the case of the F-35: minimize 
downside risks, take shortcuts when necessary, and in particular, articulate 
cost projections in such a way that those authorizing outcomes will find 
more palatable” (Nossal 2012–2013, 180). During the 2015 federal election 
campaign, the Liberal Party promised to clean up this mess by holding an 
open competition to determine which new fighter jet to purchase. However, 
in the course of the election, Liberal leader Justin Trudeau, who was eventu-
ally victorious, stated: “We will not buy the F-35 stealth fighter-bomber.” In 
July 2016, the new minister of National Defence, Harjit Sajjan, announced 
that the government “will consult with industry to determine the best new 
aircraft for Canada.” But according to media reports, Sajjan “refused to say 
whether the Liberal government still intends to hold a fighter jet competi-
tion, as it promised during last year’s election campaign” (Berthiaume 2016). 
The government’s intentions were made clearer in November 2016 when it 
declared that the competition to replace Canada’s aging fleet of CF-18 jets 
might take up to five years. It is evident, then, that Canada could still end up 
with some unnecessarily expensive military hardware.
Given this extended delay, the government argued that a “capability gap” 
was about to emerge, which meant that Canada would be unable to main-
tain its NATO commitments. As a “stop gap” measure, the government 
announced it was making a sole-source purchase of eighteen Super Hornet 
fighter jets from the Boeing Company. Critics, like the aforementioned Alan 
Williams, suggested that in this instance a sole-source arrangement, which 
does not involve a competitive bidding process, is illegal, because these types 
of arrangements can only be used in urgent and unforeseen circumstances. As 
Williams put it: “A capability gap that was allowed to grow over many years 
is hardly unforeseeable. Bad planning is not an excuse for sole-sourcing” 
(quoted in Pugliese 2016).
By late 2017, even this stop-gap proposal was collapsing as Boeing was 
busy complaining to the American government that, in its opinion, the 
Canadian company Bombardier was flooding the US market with heavily 
subsidized passenger jets, causing Boeing to lose contracts in this part of the 
aerospace market. The US Commerce Department agreed, subsequently slap-
ping import tariffs of 300 per cent on Bombardier. The response of Canada’s 
prime minister was firm, saying in direct reference to Boeing’s complaint: 
“We won’t do business with a company” that is “trying to put our aerospace 
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workers out of business” (quoted in Brewster 2017). The result is that the 
government of Canada did not call upon Boeing to fill its “gap.” Instead, by 
late 2018, Canada was arranging with Australia to purchase twenty-five of 
its aging F-18 jets.
What if a CA had addressed this issue? A CA likely would begin by 
assessing Canada’s military commitments and determining the contribu-
tions new planes would make to fulfilling those commitments. Then it might 
address the criticisms of the F-35 that were raised from the outset: Does 
Canada require expensive stealth aircraft to meet its objectives? Further-
more, is it a “deal breaker” that the F-35 is a single-engine aircraft, which 
greatly increases the risk that we could, in some cases, lose both the plane 
and the pilot? Do those risks alone mean we should recommend one of the 
twin-engine models on the market? In addition, a CA would have gauged the 
performance, in many areas, of other aircraft that could meet DNDs speci-
fications. The Assembly might have given much weight to the fact that the 
government could purchase three Super Hornets for every F-35 (Bezglasnyy 
and Ross 2011, 245).
We will never know what might have happened if Canada had had a CA. 
But let’s assume that after a recommendation from the assembly, pressure had 
fallen on the government to buy a cheaper model such as the Super Hornets, 
and the government acquiesced to that pressure. If the purchase of F-35s cost 
$35 billion, and another option came in at $12 billion, given our previous 
estimate of $81 million per year for a CA, this fictional, yet possible, recom-
mendation and ultimate decision would produce a saving of $23 billion. This 
amount would enable the government to, among other things, pay for the CA 
for the next 284 years. As it turns out, Canadians might end up saving money, 
but only because of long-running ministerial and administrative incompe-
tence; the defeat in a regularly scheduled election of the Conservative govern-
ment in 2015; and a trade dispute with the US government.
A CA would have two enormous benefits when it comes to defence 
procurement. For one, military hardware is expensive, among the dearest 
capital assets any government will purchase. If a “deluxe” product is chosen 
when a “solid” one would do, the cost to taxpayers may amount to a small 
fortune. A CA could clip the wings of those who are enamoured with “next 
generation” weaponry that is both pricey and unnecessary to meet needs. For 
another, without an open competition – or even with an open  competition – 
these types of acquisitions tend to come under suspicion. There will inevita-
bly be a feeling that some politician or bureaucrat is greasing the palms of a 
supplier in return for a reward, perhaps a future, lucrative appointment to a 
board of directors. A CA would greatly reduce those suspicions, as well as 
general public cynicism, by ensuring that any purchase has the broad support 
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of not just the generals, mandarins, and cabinet ministers, but also a repre-
sentative group of citizens.
BREXIT
As a third case study, let’s look at what can be referred to as a “social and 
political disaster.” In June 2016, the UK held a referendum on the question of 
its membership in the European Union (EU). When the ballots were counted, 
52 per cent had chosen “Leave,” while 48 per cent had selected “Remain.” 
Within this national 52/48 division, however, were serious regional splits. 
Scotland voted 62 per cent Remain, a result considered almost certain to 
provoke a second independence referendum. In England, London also chose 
“Remain” (60 per cent), but the other eight regions of the country, as well as 
Wales, voted “Leave,” though in every case by less than 60 per cent. There 
was also a clear split within regions, with larger cities voting differently than 
smaller towns and rural areas. Some of the cities that voted Remain included 
Edinburgh (74 per cent), Glasgow (67 per cent), Manchester (60 per cent), 
Cardiff (60 per cent), and Liverpool (58 per cent).
There were other divides as well. Among those voters with higher educa-
tion degrees (above the bachelor’s level), 64 per cent chose “Remain,” as did 
57 per cent of professionals and managers. Meanwhile, manual workers, the 
unemployed, and pensioners voted 64 per cent to “Leave.” Visible minori-
ties (including Asians, Blacks, and Muslims) voted heavily to “Remain,” 
while a slight majority of whites opted for “Leave.” For those who normally 
vote Conservative, 58 per cent picked “Leave”; for Labour Party supporters, 
63 per cent chose “Remain.”
Prime Minister David Cameron promised the referendum in the lead-up 
to the 2015 election, which his Conservative Party won. The offer was made 
mainly as a way of dealing with deep divisions within his own party, courtesy 
of a large group of “Eurosceptics.” The gamble backfired, ending with the 
prime minister’s resignation. Not long after, across the aisle, Labour MPs 
staged a revolt against their leader, Jeremy Corbyn, provoking a leadership 
contest in the party for the second time in a year, a contest that Corbyn won 
handily.
And then there were the broken campaign promises. The “Vote Leave” bus 
was inscribed with the slogan: “We send the EU £50 million a day. Let’s fund 
our NHS [National Health Service] instead.” There were also commitments 
to cut immigration, increase the number of school teachers, and deal with 
problems like low wages and skyrocketing rents. Not surprisingly, politi-
cians stretched the truth beyond recognition during the campaign and quickly 
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“walked back” their pledges in the days after the referendum. Outrage at 
politicians and the political process is bound to increase.
Beyond the political fallout, the economic effects of “Brexit” are also likely 
to be severe, including reduced government revenues; lost jobs, especially in 
the financial services industry; a further downgrading of the country’s credit 
rating, which makes borrowing money more expensive; and an increased 
likelihood of lower economic growth. Social conflicts soon also emerged. 
After the vote, a petition circulated calling for a second referendum based 
on the rationale that “Leave” had obtained less than 60 per cent support, and 
the result was too close to engineer such a dramatic change in the status quo. 
Many voters had “Bregrets,” admitting they didn’t quite know what they were 
voting for. Taunts against “foreigners” spiked dramatically, as the referendum 
seemed to give racists free licence to engage in verbal attacks on anyone who 
did not look “British.”
Some argue that the referendum spun out of control, becoming much more 
than its creators had intended. The vote had provided members of the work-
ing class with a chance to strike back at the elite, to make it clear that, from 
their perspective, the EU best served those with wealth and education while 
harming the poorest, creating increased competition for low-end jobs, and 
driving down wages. The referendum was tossed into a smouldering mix of 
inequality, austerity, anger, and fear. It was a tinderbox waiting for a spark, 
which came in the form of millions of commentaries on globalization and its 
effects, made with little x’s.
Of all the electoral divisions noted earlier, though, none was as conse-
quential as the division by age.4 For eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, 73 
per cent chose Remain. The figure was 62 per cent for twenty-five- to thirty-
four-year-olds and 52 per cent for those aged thirty-five to forty-four. Mean-
while, just 40 per cent of those aged sixty-five and over sided with “Remain.” 
What this means, all else being equal, is that in perhaps another twenty years, 
a follow-up referendum would almost certainly find a comfortable majority 
of UK residents voting to “Breturn.” This whole social and political mess, as 
it turns out, may have been for naught. Meanwhile, the UK government has 
spent a few years trying to extricate itself from the EU.5
The EU referendum highlighted the multitude of ways in which the UK 
finds itself a deeply divided nation. What might have happened instead if a 
CA had been in place? A CA could have been a source of conflict resolution, 
or at least a way to ease tensions in society, by providing a forum for calm 
examination of an issue troubling the citizenry. Instead, the UK engaged in 
a referendum on a complex and multifaceted issue, where only two choices 
were available: “Leave” or “Remain.” An assembly, after a few months of 
consultation and deliberation, could have produced a more nuanced recom-
mendation, perhaps something like: “We wish to remain in the EU, but only 
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if the following conditions are met.” In response, the government could have 
embarked on a series of domestic reforms, while lobbying for changes to the 
EU itself. It could have then returned to the assembly, say, five years down 
the road, after reforms had been implemented, asking: “Would you now rec-
ommend unconditionally that we remain part of the EU?”
As it turns out, there was a Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit, launched in 
April 2017 by the Constitution Unit at University College London, with 
funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. The assembly 
brought together fifty citizens for two weekends in September–October to 
discuss and vote on options for Brexit, particularly in the areas of trade and 
immigration, and to issue a report with recommendations for the government. 
Speaking to the assembly, Labour MP Kate Green lamented: “It’s a great pity 
that we didn’t have a citizens’ assembly before the referendum took place, 
on what is actually the biggest political, economic, and constitutional deci-
sion of my adult lifetime” (quoted in Constitution Unit 2017). Indeed, while 
this CA served as another important experiment in highlighting the value of 
assemblies, it must be regarded as a case of “too little, too late.” Holding its 
discussions more than a year following the Brexit referendum, the assembly 
was akin to passengers arriving at port long after their ship had sailed.
The CA on Brexit, then, demonstrated an important limitation of ad hoc 
CAs, namely their very adhockery. One of the key lessons of Brexit, and for 
sure a “great pity,” is that there is not much point in creating a CA in the midst 
of a full-blown crisis, when the political waters are boiling over the edge, 
because that CA will not be in a position to provide significant benefits to a 
society that is already at war with itself. It would serve little purpose, arriv-
ing on the scene too late – an example of a political collective rushing to a 
hardware store to purchase an extinguisher when its house is on fire. Instead, 
preventative measures should be put in place to either head off conflicts like 
Brexit or at least limit their adverse consequences. It is in times like those that 
produced the Brexit meltdown that a permanent CA – one which is trusted, 
long-standing, and well known – would prove its value, serving as a type of 
insurance policy against social turmoil and its attendant carnage.
This is why I doubt the efficacy of a call, very late in the day, by a number 
of people for a Brexit CA, including by Neal Lawson (2018), chair of the 
pressure group Compass, who maintained that an assembly is “a simple and 
compelling idea that could break the logjam of a parliament that isn’t built 
to represent the ways in which the UK now divides, allowing instead for a 
form of reasoned politics to get us out of this mess.” Similarly, James Bridle’s 
(2018) plea for a CA, which would provide “an opportunity for people to 
actually engage with the messy business of politics, rather than shout and 
wave flags from the sidelines,” is also likely to fall on deaf ears. Once knives 
have been drawn, most people will not have the patience to reflect on, among 
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other things, the meaning of ancient Greek terms such as kleroterion, pinakia, 
clepsydra, and ostraka (all mentioned by Bridle in his article). Still, further 
calls were made for an assembly, including one by a couple of Labour MPs 
(Elgot 2019).
Not to be outdone, just days later, former prime minister Gordon Brown 
(2019) also proposed a series of CAs, which would “lead to constructive 
reconsideration by parliament of our relations with Europe.” In the comments 
section following the article, a number of people supported Brown’s call, but 
just as many, if not more, were opposed. Among other things, these com-
mentators: (a) wondered how members of the assemblies would be chosen; 
(b) argued that creating assemblies after a referendum was undemocratic; 
(c) suggested the issue was too complex for the general public to have a say; 
and (d) maintained that, in some ways, the exercise was pointless, because 
the UK had already had a “citizens’ assembly.” The following is a sample of 
the comments. They highlight the fact that, across much of the UK, there was 
a – perfectly understandable – lack of patience for the idea that CAs might be 
parachuted into the Brexit maelstrom.
Who gets to decide who sits in a Peoples’ Assembly? (RedLenin)
Who will choose the members for the Citizens’ Assembly, I wonder? The Estab-
lishment??? (RevoltingPensioner)
Stuffed no doubt with the usual suspects to get the answer you want. (Id1649)
Citizens’ assembly, composed of who? Chosen how? A random sample? Very 
old woman, “Do I get to meet that very nice Maggie Thatcher?,” addled brain 
drug addict, alcoholic, people who have never voted before (lots of them about), 
“the EU . . . what’s that, is it them bloody foreigners?” If you have to apply, this 
will just be a particular unrepresentative subset of the UK population and will 
be very little different to the MP subset except less well informed. (Alan1987)
I see huge problems with this repeated suggestion of a “Citizens’ Assem-
bly.” . . . unless attendance is compulsory, the delegates will be, to a great 
extent, self-selecting. . . . With work and family commitments, are you going 
to get a truly random selection? Who can take, say, a one month “time out”? 
There’s a risk of ending up with those who are passionate about their positions 
and therefore inflexible. (DenisCooper)
So [it’s] basically a cross between Question Time and a pub chat. I can’t see 
that coming to any agreement, let alone providing a clear path forward. Leaving 
aside the detail about how one creates a representative sample – whoever shouts 
loudest gets on the panel? – who would decide the agenda? Would there be a 
referee to enforce rules, validate facts, count votes . . . or what? Blithely com-
ing up with a “citizens’ assembly” is as ill-conceived as proposing to solve an 
undefined problem with a badly worded referendum. (graun)
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Apart from anything else, we’d spend two years arguing over who was on the 
Assembly. (teeps2016)
Who chooses the people on the assembly? Who decides that the people who 
pick them are neutral? On what basis do you choose them? If it’s 52% Leav-
ers and 48% Remainers, then what’s the point? . . . How many people do you 
have on the assembly? What is the scope of their mandate? If asking 45 million 
people to vote again now that they know more about Brexit is undemocratic, 
how can asking 100, 200, 500 people to decide in their place be any more demo-
cratic? People’s Vote! (williamgeorgefraser)
I would love to see the criteria involved in choosing this golden kangaroo 
court. . . . [And] how is it that [the] 100 or whatever chosen have some 
sort of legitimacy over the millions that voted in the 2016 referendum? 
(Kissingerwozhere)
How can a citizens’ assembly involving a small group of people be demo-
cratically superior to a referendum involving the entire UK voting population? 
(Justice180)
So we should put off implementing the result of a referendum, so you can run 
a few focus groups? Come off it. Putting “People’s” or “Citizens’ ” in front of 
something does not make it a better or more democratic idea. (HeatonMoor)
A citizens’ assembly is no more representative than elected MPs in a represen-
tational system of government, and will never be accepted as legitimate, if the 
result is to overturn the referendum. (brighterday)
A referendum would be more democratic than a citizens’ assembly. It’s a ridicu-
lous idea and will hopefully be treated with the scorn it deserves. (BigBanana)
As bad as politicians are, no, I don’t want any Tom, Dick, or Harry calling the 
shots. (RightySmitey)
This reminds me of the “gilets jaunes” in France, who think they should be run-
ning the country. Their idea is to replace the elected assemblies, mainly made 
up from people who have been successful in life, by people like themselves who 
have been far less successful. ( jifferyvtwo)
The purpose of this so-called “Citizens’ Assembly” is to overturn the referen-
dum. For those who keep shouting “Exit Brexit” this must seem like a good 
idea. It would be the death of democracy. No thanks. (argotique)
“A citizens’ assembly is now the only way to break the Brexit deadlock.” No, 
it isn’t. Trying to get people who don’t understand complex and interlinked 
ideas to make decisions that impact the rest of us is a disaster. Unless you’re 
going to IQ test everyone that gets on the panel then this is doomed to failure. 
(MattBucks)
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No, no, no! We do not need an unelected focus group at this point. It is fraught 
with problems and will be undermined by the same hard, right-wing, under-
handed tactics deployed before. We need intelligence applied to the problem, 
not random people with pub opinions. I would not accept the result of such a 
group. (KHLondon)
Such assemblies are very easy to manipulate by whoever controls the flow of 
information to them, whether or not these assemblies nominally have the power 
to gather information themselves. . . . What safeguards would there be to ensure 
a Brexit “citizens’ assembly” isn’t just captured by one side of the argument 
(most likely Remain given its support among the powerful who are invested in 
the status quo) and browbeaten into submission through a flow of biased infor-
mation? (imperium3)
The people are too ill informed to make a decision. Please, please, please leave 
it to those who know how politics works and those experts who have served us 
so well in the past. Never ever ask the people again. (tibbzy)
What on earth is a citizens’ assembly? Blokes in berets and/or yellow vests 
shouting at one another? Yeah, that should work. (severnboar)
There is an underlying assumption that a citizens’ assembly will be nice and 
sensible, but if it properly represents the UK it will be bickering and biased. 
(chris1958)
We already have a citizens’ assembly; it’s called Parliament. What we actually 
need now is some decisive leadership. (RacingMichelle)
We had a citizens’ assembly in 2016. More citizens than ever before in history 
assembled to vote and the majority of those that voted, voted to leave the EU. 
Since then, people like Gordon Brown and so, so, so many others have sought 
to overturn the vote of the greatest citizens’ assembly EVER. (Pleaforcalm)
The referendum in 2016 was a citizens’ assembly. The government asked the 
citizens to assemble at polling stations and cast a vote instructing them on 
whether to leave the EU or remain and promised the citizens their instruction 
will be carried out. The majority, 17.4 million, voted to leave. (AuthurFerksake)
Citizens Assembly? You mean members of the public selected by public ballot 
to represent the people? You mean . . . MP’s??!! (Mizzentop)
Hilarious. What dingbat dreamt up the Guardian/Labour/Momentum-friendly 
Citizens’, sorry People’s, Assembly? I mean is this REALLY an answer to 
anything? Completely and utterly bonkers idea. Policy by People’s Assembly? 
Raving mad. Anyway – we HAD a People’s Assembly – or two in fact – the EU 
Referendum and the General Election! They are TRUE People’s Assemblies, 
enabling ALL the People to be involved. (ninjawarrior)
No to a citizens assembly . . . although I have a nice Twitter focus group you 
might be interested in. How about a Facebook emoji vote down? (greenhat2017)
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This is the third such article in the Guardian over the past two weeks. Please 
stop it! It’s a ridiculous idea and no one but a small minority want it. (Blockz99)
In his piece, Brown argued that the “direct engagement of the British people 
is now essential, in order to address the triple challenge of a government defy-
ing the sovereignty of parliament, an even more divided country, and mount-
ing distrust between parliament and people.” But anyone cynical of Brown’s 
motives might ask: Why is it only now that it is essential for the government 
to engage with its citizens? In contrast, given the comments above, I suggest 
that “now” would be an inappropriate moment to begin innovative consulta-
tion processes with the public. A national crisis is a time when governments 
should be able to use these processes, not create them. In sum, the Brexit 
disaster should serve as a stern warning, a crow cawing on a fence post, to 
all democratic nations (and not just the UK) that want to reduce, as much as 
possible, the potential for various kinds of civic traumas.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WARS
Finally, in concluding this brief survey, let’s look at a case that must qualify 
as an unmitigated “human and financial disaster,” the Iraq and Afghani-
stan Wars. The cost to Iraq has been the heaviest of all, with total violent 
deaths, including combatants, conservatively estimated in November 2018 
at 288,000.6 The conflict has produced around four million refugees and 
internally displaced persons, while creating a “failed state.” This disaster 
culminated with both Iraq and neighbouring Syria descending into civil war, 
producing in Syria a further 400,000 deaths, five million refugees, six million 
displaced persons, and the initiation of numerous terrorist attacks throughout 
the world at the hands of the “Islamic State” (ISIS).
For the United States, over 4,500 troops were killed and tens of thousands 
suffered devastating injuries. Today, over 100,000 veterans are dealing with 
serious psychological issues caused by the war. The financial cost was also 
huge, though relatively little of that cost was “up front.” The invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan were the cheapest parts of the conflicts, even though these 
expenses included pay for soldiers, transportation of troops, food and hous-
ing, and the purchase of equipment and weapons. The major part of the cost 
relates to the fact that these wars were paid for with borrowed money. No new 
taxes were implemented by the administration of George W. Bush; indeed, 
his tenure as president was marked by significant tax cuts. So, the total costs 
of these conflicts must include annual interest payments made on borrowed 
money; future interest payments that will need to be paid on money already 
borrowed; and future interest payments that will be paid on money the 
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American government will have to borrow down the road to cover the ongo-
ing costs of the wars, such as disability pensions, that could continue for up to 
half-a-century. By 2008, the interest costs alone for the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts amounted to $900 billion (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008, 122).
Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008, 31) calculate that the total price tag of these 
wars to America alone will be roughly $3 trillion, a figure that, they say, 
“strikes us as judicious, and in all likelihood errs on the low side.” The pro-
jected expense, however, rises substantially if we include macroeconomic 
costs, such as higher oil prices, and the failure to invest the money spent in 
projects such as schools and roads, which have a greater rate of return. These 
costs bring the grand total of the Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts to $5 trillion, 
excluding interest payments (130).
Let’s assume that the United States had had a CA in 2003 consisting of 244 
members (half of each state’s seats in the House of Representatives, rounded 
up to the nearest whole number). Let’s also assume that total expenses were 
in proportion to those for a Canadian CA as noted earlier. If the Iraq War 
cost $3 trillion, and the cost of a US Assembly is $115 million per year – 
and if this CA had recommended against proceeding with the war, and if 
enough pressure had then been placed on Congress and the president to 
accept this recommendation – the CA would have paid for itself for the next 
26,000 years. Alternatively, to pick just one policy option, $3 trillion could 
build 24 million housing units; one new home for every fourth family in 
America (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008, xv).
The latest revised price tag for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (as well 
as Syria and Pakistan), though, places the total cost nearer to $4.8 trillion, 
including interest paid on borrowed money up to August 2016 (Crawford 
2016). Between 2017 and 2053, however, costs are going to spiral upwards, 
because veterans’ disability and special health care needs will require $1 tril-
lion, while interest payments on government debts incurred because of the 
wars are projected to rise to a whopping $8 trillion (assuming no new taxes 
are put in place to cover these payments). This projected total is almost dou-
ble the entire cost of the wars up to 2016. By mid-century, then, the overall 
price tag might exceed $13 trillion, or enough to build over 100 million hous-
ing units, which would amount to a new home for almost every family in the 
country. It would also be enough to pay for a CA for the next 113,000 years.
The United States was not the only NATO country to go to war with 
Iraq. Despite an anti-war march of 1.5 million people in London in February 
2003, the UK, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, also rushed off to war. In 
June 2016, the long-awaited results of an inquiry into that war were released 
(the Chilcot report). Among other things, the inquiry lambasted the for-
mer prime minister, specifically for propounding a weak case for war. The 
government exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein; relied on 
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flawed intelligence, including material poached from the Internet; sent an 
ill-equipped army into battle; and could not, in advance of the conflict, draw 
out a cogent post-war scenario, certainly not one that included a peaceful and 
democratic Iraq. While harsh on the major players who beat the drums of war, 
the Chilcot report, at the same time, levelled a devastating critique of the UK’s 
democratic institutions. It seems that, through propaganda and the manipula-
tion of public opinion, many citizens were deceived into supporting the war. 
Not only, then, does Chilcot provide lessons for UK citizens and their gov-
ernment, it provides lessons for citizens in every democratic polity; namely, 
that no nation is immune to the folly that led the Labour government, with the 
support of almost all Conservative MPs, to perpetrate one of the most easily 
foreseeable tragedies we have witnessed since the end of World War II.7
Arrogant politicians, military “leaders,” intelligence “experts,” and civil 
servants have produced no shortage of financial, economic, political, social, 
and human catastrophes, and have done so frequently even in nations with 
strong democratic traditions. CAs could not guarantee that similar disasters 
would never again happen, but I suspect they would greatly reduce the odds 
of them occurring. As things stand in most democratic nations, though, 
citizens lack sufficient protection against these types of calamities, or even 
smaller-scale debacles for that matter. Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008, 186) make 
this argument when they point to what might be the most important lesson 
we need to learn about the Iraq War, namely that America’s “checks and 
balances failed at home, and there was no one abroad that was willing or 
able to stop us from the early and mad decision to invade Iraq.” They add 
that there are currently no national or international institutions, not even 
the United Nations, “that can provide an adequate check against a major 
country determined to go to war, even if it is plainly contrary to interna-
tional law.”
These four case studies highlight the problematic nature of public policy 
decision-making processes in three countries. Readers who live outside these 
countries will no doubt be able to rhyme off numerous other examples that 
could be added to this catalogue of failures. They make clear that political 
systems typically cannot pass an important litmus test, namely, that “even 
if unwise initial commitments are made,” policy processes should be “intel-
ligent enough to allow modification or abandonment of projects as the initial 
mistake becomes clear” (Moran 2001, 418). Citizens should not have to 
depend on happenstance or the fortuitous timing of an election to be able to 
intervene when they perceive that they are witnessing an unfolding policy 
disaster. Nor should they have to find themselves neck-deep in political 
quicksand, having realized too late that the profound damage that govern-
ments have caused in their names cannot be undone. A CA could examine 
issues before, in conjunction with, or even after a legislature does so. The 
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goal would be to reduce the chances of miscalculations, some of them irre-
versible, which have terrible costs, costs that may have to be paid for genera-
tions to come. For sure, enhancing democracy with a CA would come at a 
price. But the absence of democracy almost invariably ends up generating 
price tags that are much dearer in the long run.
NOTES
 1. These words, written over twenty years ago, could have been taken verbatim 
from the July 2016 Iraq War Inquiry (the Chilcot Report) in the UK (see further).
 2. In the election held in October 2018, the PQ’s decline continued; its support 
fell to 17 per cent, the lowest level in its history. It won just ten seats in the 125-seat 
National Assembly.
 3. In March 2019, Quebec’s new government, elected in October 2018, led by the 
Coalition avenir Québec, introduced its own legislation on secularism (Bill 21), so the 
story continues.
 4. There was no gender division between “Leave” and “Remain” supporters; both 
men and women split 52 per cent to “Leave” and 48 per cent to “Remain.”
 5. At the time of this writing, the UK was scheduled to “crash out” of the Euro-
pean Union on 31 October 2019, if it fails to secure a deal with the EU.
 6. See iraqbodycount.org.
 7. To their credit, eighty-four Labour MPs voted against the Iraq War in 2003; 
only two Conservative MPs voted “No.”
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Chapter 6
Replacing an Upper House?
This book has recommended the creation of a national CA, which would 
become a permanent supplement to democratic institutions. While the result 
would, I argue, be a significant improvement on the status quo, some coun-
tries might also want to consider having a CA, in time, replace elected or 
unelected legislatures which serve as “upper houses.”1 This chapter is a case 
study for such consideration, focusing on the Senate of Canada.
As Canadians know all too well, senators are appointed by the prime 
minister and serve until age seventy-five with no requirement to defend their 
actions via elections at any point. At various times, most Canadian provinces 
also had similar unelected “Legislative Councils,” which included a few 
oddities. For instance, in Ontario after 1840, the Council was elected, but 
many questioned why a second house, beyond the Legislative Assembly, was 
required to pass the same law. At Confederation in 1867, it seemed perfectly 
understandable when the province got rid of this Council, and “in the years 
since, nobody has even noticed it’s gone” (Boyer 2014, 169). All provinces 
that have had such Councils have abolished them, with Quebec the last to do 
so in 1968. The history of Canada’s unelected and unaccountable “councils” 
differs at the federal level, however.
While the provinces have been busy reforming their democratic insti-
tutions, the Senate of Canada has drifted along for a century-and-a-half, 
despite having played almost no notable role in governance. This is the case 
because it has never had a useful purpose. According to one of the “Fathers 
of Confederation,” Georges-Étienne Cartier, the Senate was put in place in 
order to buttress “mixed” government, to serve as a “power of resistance to 
oppose the democratic element,” that is, the House of Commons (quoted in 
Boyer 2014, 183). Boyer (125, 231) argues that the Senate “was not meant 
to be independent or objective or dispassionate, but a bulwark to thwart any 
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challenges to the established social order.” Yet, the House of Commons has 
never initiated any remotely radical legislation, so the Senate has had little to 
do in this regard from the moment of its inception, which is just one of the 
reasons why Boyer sees the institution as little more than a “colonial relic.”
Defenders of the Senate suggest it has made three important contributions 
to our political life; however, these claims made on behalf of the Upper 
House do not withstand even brief scrutiny. First, the Senate supposedly 
represents the various regions of Canada. In fact, senators have never rep-
resented broad geographic “regions,” but rather specific provinces. Yet, for 
quite some time, regional interests have been protected by strong provincial 
governments, which can do most anything they want to, with obvious excep-
tions such as national defence; federal-provincial agreements, such as the 
2016 expansion of the Canada Pension Plan; the convention of appointing 
Supreme Court justices from the various regions, including three from Que-
bec, three from Ontario, two from the West, and one from Atlantic Canada; 
and the convention of appointing members from across the country to the 
federal executive (in 2015, the Liberal cabinet had eleven MPs from Ontario, 
seven from Quebec, and at least one from each of the other provinces and one 
from the territories).
Second, the Senate does not protect minority rights or violations of the 
liberties of the people; that is the job of Human Rights Commissions and the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court which now 
serves as our main arena of sober second thought and, unlike our innocuous 
Senate, can declare legislation unconstitutional, forcing the government of 
the day to go back to the drawing board.2 In fact, the Senate does not protect 
us from anything. Its proponents say it could help prevent “tyranny” if some 
authoritarian government managed to get its claws on the House of Com-
mons. However, this wildly dystopian scenario is highly unlikely. Besides, if 
we ever find ourselves in such a situation, it seems implausible that senators 
could hold back what would be, in effect, a coup d’état. If the only thing 
standing between Canadians and a dictatorship is 105 unelected sinecurists 
then we might want to consider rewriting our constitution.
Third, even the Senate’s supposed skills in investigation and research have 
now been overtaken by the many institutes and centres found throughout our 
nation’s universities, civil society organizations, business and trade union 
confederations, and numerous think tanks representing views across the 
ideological spectrum.
This leaves us with the Senate’s supposed main role as the home of sober 
second thought. In the words of the country’s first prime minister, Sir John A. 
Macdonald, the Senate could prevent “any hasty or ill considered legislation” 
from becoming law (quoted in Forsey 2015, 4). But even in the midst of an 
apparent crisis, when such legislation might be on the table, the Senate’s role 
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is both dubious and potentially controversial. The last such crisis arguably 
occurred in 1988, when the Senate defeated Bill C-30, which would have 
implemented a free trade agreement between Canada and the United States. 
The governing Conservatives, who held a majority in the House, called an 
election, which they won easily. Given this outcome, the Senate appears to 
have misjudged the public, thinking the people were opposed to free trade, 
hence forcing a vote on the issue. In the course of its work, the House passes 
hundreds of bills that the public never gets to vote on, so why did the Senate 
choose to defeat this one? In the end, the Upper House reluctantly passed the 
bill after the 1988 election. Helen Forsey (2015, 15) says that in this case, the 
Senate used “its ‘reserve’ power in the interests of democracy.” But that’s 
not how the ultimate winners of the free trade debate would have viewed its 
actions, especially when our Senators’ supposed defence of democracy was 
subsequently given a sharp slap on the wrist by the electorate.
The Senate does not serve us well at moments of perceived crisis, nor does 
it seem to do much better during “normal” times. For instance, from 2003 to 
2009, of the 300 bills that went before the Senate, 88 per cent were passed 
without a single amendment (Forsey 2015, 9). There was the odd bill where 
the Senate had some input, but these involved suggesting mostly minor alter-
ations. The Senate has had opportunities to challenge bills from the House, 
as it did in June 2016 with legislation legalizing assisted-dying in certain 
circumstances, yet in this instance it gave up on its most important objection. 
The Upper House agreed to pass Bill C-14 just days after it had returned 
the bill to the House for revisions, with many Senators arguing it permitted 
doctor-assisted dying only for those whose deaths were “reasonably foresee-
able,” hence failing to meet the requirements outlined in a recent Supreme 
Court decision. Senators wisely concluded that they were in no position to 
defeat the will of the elected House. The lead Senator on the file, Serge Joyal, 
basically admitted he was helpless, telling the media: “It was a very sad day. 
Parliament decided quite openly to exclude citizens whose rights have been 
already granted by the Supreme Court” (quoted in Stone 2016). Within days 
of the law’s passage, a British Columbia woman, Julia Lamb, who has spinal 
muscular atrophy, decided to challenge the law, with the support of the BC 
Civil Liberties Association. Each senator has a lengthy sinecure, but in this 
instance, they could not, as a group, accomplish much of anything useful.
Given its ineffectiveness, why then is the Senate not reformed to improve 
its functioning? One of the more commonly suggested solutions to this “inef-
fectiveness malaise” is to elect senators. However, if this ever came to pass, 
senators, like their American counterparts, could rightfully claim legitimacy 
based on having the support of “the people,” which might contribute greatly 
to legislative gridlock similar to what can be observed in Congress, a system 
so dysfunctional it is harmful to whichever party is trying to govern. If, on 
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the other hand, our Senate were elected but not given the moral authority to 
defeat a bill passed in the House of Commons, it would be a toothless dupli-
cate of the House and hence of questionable value. What this means is that, in 
important ways, the Senate cannot be reformed. The fact that senators are not 
elected is the problem. The fact that the Senate must never be elected leads 
me to conclude that abolishing the Upper Chamber is the only solution to the 
problem. And yet, Canadians seem unwilling to take this step.
So what is to be done? My solution is that, over time, a CA could replace 
the Senate. The CA could continue with its original function of making 
recommendations, but might also be given added responsibilities to assess 
and vote on bills arising from the House. The CA still would not be able to 
propose a bill, and it could not defeat a bill, though it could postpone one 
for six to twelve months, with the exception of budgetary matters. Any CA 
would likely invoke this limited power only in highly unusual circumstances; 
it could even be restricted to issuing just one or two of these legislative 
“red cards” each year. At the same time, we could decide that this is not an 
appropriate function for the CA, and that it should continue in its advisory 
role only.
With a demonstrably effective CA in place, with or without additional 
powers, Canada could decide to abolish its Senate. If it were to take this 
not-so-bold step, it would have an opportunity to “promote” the CA to quasi-
legislative status. By then, perhaps twenty or thirty years after its inception, 
once almost everyone is comfortable with and supportive of the CA, it could 
be made part of the country’s formal constitution. The overall result would be 
an improvement on the status quo, as the CA would have a unique composi-
tion of members (with its representative sample of the population) appointed 
for relatively brief periods of time. And it would serve the unique function 
of addressing pressing questions of public policy, based on the assembly’s 
assessment of what constitutes “pressing.”
Some argue that abolishing the Senate “would be an unprecedented trans-
formation of our whole system of government, with huge ramifications for 
the principles of federalism and democracy” (Forsey 2015, 81). Current sena-
tor Serge Joyal claims that getting rid of the Senate “would have a profound 
and nefarious impact on the equilibrium of our constitutional polity and the 
effectiveness of its institutions” (quoted in Forsey 2015, 84). But these com-
ments amount to little more than traditionalist scare-mongering. Canadian 
democracy would no more notice the disappearance of the Senate than a child 
would notice the disappearance of its appendix. The abolition of upper cham-
bers does not seem to have hurt many countries, ones similar to Canada, that 
have long since rid themselves of unnecessary second legislatures, includ-
ing Finland (which did so in 1906), New Zealand (1951), Denmark (1953), 
Sweden (1970), and Norway (2009, though it had an odd form of “qualified 
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unicameralism” after 1814). It doesn’t seem to have hurt any of Canada’s ten 
provinces or three territories either, some of which have not had “bicameral” 
legislatures for a century-and-a-half.
In sum, if a viable CA were in place, say, for more than two decades, it 
could serve as a potential replacement for the Senate, giving the provinces the 
incentive they need to vote to eliminate the Upper Chamber. Citizens might, 
in turn, decide that the Senate should continue, even after the CA has become 
permanent. After all, it is basically a harmless institution. Even its $100 mil-
lion annual price tag amounted to just 0.04 per cent of 2016–2017 federal 
government expenditures. We could easily afford both institutions if need be, 
though with a CA in place, the Senate would almost certainly have an even 
more marginal role in Canada’s political life than it does now.
The CA would be an experiment in democracy that, after roughly a decade, 
could be renewed or halted; at around the twenty-year mark, it would be made 
permanent or ended, with the citizenry in both cases making the decision, via 
referenda timed to coincide with general elections. As it evolves, academ-
ics and practitioners from a variety of disciplines would study the CA, and 
modifications could quickly be made to whichever procedures were deemed 
inadequate. As part of its evolution, the CA would work in a rented space 
for its first two decades. At that point, if a majority voted to make this tem-
porary experiment permanent, the government, and by extension the public, 
could commit to building an architectural masterpiece – a tourist attraction as 
impressive as the current Parliament buildings – as a beautiful home for the 
assembly in recognition of the important place it would occupy in the nation’s 
political and cultural life.
NOTES
 1. Readers are likely to be able to find institutions in their own countries which 
can be similarly replaced (e.g. the House of Lords in the UK). In nations such as the 
United States, it is unlikely that my proposal would be given serious consideration. 
Each state has two seats in the Senate, so reconfiguring this institution to make it 
representative of population would require small states to give up the vastly dispro-
portional amount of power granted to them by the Constitution, which is never going 
to happen.
 2. Parliament can, under the Charter’s “notwithstanding clause,” suspend certain 
rights for up to five years, with the possibility of renewals of the suspension. Parlia-
ment can do this despite a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary. However, it is testi-
mony to the respect granted to the Court’s decisions that the federal government has 




Public apathy and political ignorance are a fundamental fact today, beyond 
any possible dispute; decisions are made by political leaders, not by popu-
lar vote, which at best has only an occasional veto power after the fact. The 
issue is whether this state of affairs is, under modern conditions, a neces-
sary and desirable one, or whether new forms of popular participation, in 
the Athenian spirit though not in the Athenian substance, if I may phrase 
it that way, need to be invented.
– M.I. Finley (1985, 36)
One of the imperative needs of democratic countries is to improve citizens’ 
capacities to engage intelligently in political life. I don’t mean to suggest 
that the institutions for civic education developed in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries should be abandoned. But I do believe that in the years 
to come these older institutions will need to be enhanced by new means 
for civic education, political participation, information, and deliberation 
that draw creatively on the array of techniques and technologies available 
in the twenty-first century. We have barely begun to think seriously about 
these possibilities, much less to test them out in small-scale experiments.
– Robert A. Dahl (1998, 187–88)
In July 2016, Justin Trudeau announced the creation of the Prime Minister’s 
Youth Council, which was to consist of thirty Canadians aged sixteen to 
twenty-four who would draw up a list of their concerns and give the prime 
minister advise on youth policy. The official website of the Council noted 
that successful applicants “will meet both online and offline several times a 
year to discuss issues that matter to you, your community, and your country. 
Council members will interact with each other outside of meetings to discuss 
ideas and upcoming activities and will engage with their communities.”
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Like many of the other examples of government seeking input, mentioned 
throughout this book, this Council is likely to make a useful contribution 
to public debates. However, the ideas developed by youth would likely be 
more effective if brought forward within the confines of a CA. In Canada, 
those aged eighteen to twenty-nine form 20 per cent of the adult population. 
In an assembly of 172 persons, there would be about thirty-five MCAs from 
the men and women who make up this age group, or about the same number 
that the prime minister will have on his council. Youth Council members, 
however, will be selected from a series of applicants, which is likely to skew 
towards those with higher than average education levels and those from 
higher-income backgrounds. In contrast, MCAs would be chosen at random. 
More importantly, Youth Council members, while consulting broadly, will 
still make their recommendations in a sort of “youth vacuum,” as it were, 
in some ways talking only to themselves. In contrast, younger people in an 
assembly could engage in a fruitful dialogue across demographic ranges. It 
would be especially important for older MCAs, who are often regarded by 
youth as being part of “privileged” generations, to play a role in addressing the 
challenges faced by those who are just beginning to enter the world of work.
The Youth Council is just one example among many that could be given. 
In October 2016, a year after the Liberal Party was returned to power, the 
new government highlighted its commitment to “listening” via no fewer than 
eighty-four consultations “about everything from food additives and species 
at risk to a national housing strategy and security policy.” The government 
claimed to be engaging Canadians through “discussion papers, surveys, 
online portals for written submissions, public meetings, regional and national 
roundtables, social media, teleconferences, and webinars” (Bronskill 2016).3 
Duff Conacher, a founder of Democracy Watch, referred to these activities 
as “squeaky-wheel consultations,” which is precisely what they are. Paul 
Thomas, professor emeritus of political studies at the University of Manitoba, 
pointed out the major drawback of these consultations when he asked: “How 
representative are those people who go online and contribute to discussions 
that are taking place in cyberspace? And how do you integrate that kind of 
public feedback with the expert advice that’s coming from the specialists 
inside government?” (quoted in Bronskill 2016).
It seems, then, that while the government is open to incorporating ideas 
from the electorate, it will do so using methods that are, in many ways, deeply 
flawed. In contrast, a CA could help people deal in an intelligent and thought-
ful manner with the critical issues that invariably bubble to the surface, 
whether student tuition, old age pensions, military procurement, international 
treaties, or the many-faceted issues raised by social movements such as Idle 
No More. It could also help citizens to come to grips with the most distressing 
of matters governments are likely to face, including evaluating the pros and 
cons of going to war.
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Ireland’s temporary CA (mentioned in chapter 1) provides a current exam-
ple of this need to “come to grips” with difficult issues. In April 2017, this 
CA voted 64 per cent to recommend that a woman should be able to choose to 
have an abortion if she wishes to without having to provide any justification 
for her choice. Two months later, the CA, chaired by Supreme Court Justice 
Mary Laffoy, presented its recommendation to the Oireachtas, the Irish Par-
liament. After they completed their task, Justice Laffoy thanked MCAs for 
having tackled “some of the most complex pieces of legislation, immersed 
themselves in medical and ethical discourse, and listened with respect to 
the voices and opinions of others” (quoted in BBC News 2017). Journalist 
Alison O’Connor (2017) also observed the “high level of sophistication” and 
“overall collegiality” of MCAs. She said that while watching “the citizens in 
all their hours of deliberation, it was remarkable there never appeared to be 
anything other than full concentration and engagement.” She pointed out that 
the group had been presented with an especially “tough task,” given “what 
they were dealing with, involving everything from dry, dense legal argument, 
where no certainty at all exists, to the raw emotion of women telling their 
personal stories of termination [abortion].” In addition to highlighting the 
quality of the discussions in the assembly, Justice Laffoy also acknowledged 
the MCAs “whose perspectives or opinions did not emerge in the final vote,” 
emphasizing the point that the assembly was “an exercise in deliberative 
democracy, and their vote remains important to me because of the very fact it 
captures that other perspective, that dissenting voice, the different interpreta-
tion, and I wish to assure them that their votes and voices will be recorded 
and have a place in the report” (quoted in BBC News 2017).
Despite Justice Laffoy’s comments, we might expect that those who did 
not support the final recommendation would condemn not only the recom-
mendation itself but also the democratic body that produced it. Indeed, a 
spokesperson for the Pro Life Campaign was quick to assert that the CA’s 
conclusions reflected a “chaotic” and “one-sided approach”; the assembly, 
in her view, was little more than a “muddled and confused farce” (quoted in 
BBC News 2017). A columnist for The Irish Catholic maintained that “there 
is no way that these radical proposals represent the will of the Irish people. 
Either the CA was unrepresentative from the very beginning, or the balance 
of speakers and presenters was such that they were persuaded to take a radical 
stance on abortion provision” (O’Brien 2017).
These types of criticisms are ones we should anticipate when CAs are tem-
porary (or even freshly-minted permanent institutions). Over time, though, 
individuals will come to see the value of a CA, and use its recommendations 
as a “taking-off point” for ensuing actions. In the Irish case, this would mean 
that those who favour restrictions on access to abortions could lobby their 
politicians, appear before parliamentary committees, generate public relations 
campaigns, organize street protests, and so forth. These activities can even 
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continue after legislation is passed that is antithetical to the beliefs of opponents 
of abortion, in the hope that, at some point in the future, they could reverse laws 
and regulations they find objectionable. This would be a more civil way to pro-
ceed than attempting to vilify a deeply democratic process that had produced a 
recommendation on how people could resolve an ongoing controversy.
This CA gifted Ireland’s politicians a community-determined recom-
mendation on the question of abortion, a recommendation that, according 
to one commentator, “took politicians by surprise.” All along, opinion polls 
had suggested “a more limited pro-repeal [of the Eighth Amendment] posi-
tion among the electorate.” However, “the assembly heard a wide range of 
information and perspectives, took its time, engaged in deliberation, and had 
a serious debate about reproductive autonomy of a kind that has rarely been 
possible in recent decades in Ireland. Having done that, it reached a range 
of pro-choice conclusions” (de Londras 2017). The ball was moved to the 
politicians’ court; the assembly’s recommendations meant legislators could 
no longer use the constitution as a “security blanket,” insulating themselves 
from the question of abortion. Citizens could demand that those elected to 
govern “be compelled to spell out which abortions are permitted, which are 
not, and why” (de Londras 2017). In light of the assembly’s report, the gov-
ernment held a referendum in May 2018 in which 66 per cent voted to repeal 
the Eighth Amendment. So just one year after the CA made its recommenda-
tions, it could be said that “an unlikely assemblage of housewives, students, 
ex-teachers, truck drivers, and others” had “brought Ireland to the brink of 
radical change to its abortion laws” (Chalmers 2018).
Even with the obvious benefits a CA can bring, as exemplified by the 
Irish Assembly, naysayers are certain to abound. One of the reasons for this 
is that the holders of power in our current institutions “seldom willingly 
accept deliberative transformations that dilute their authority or weaken their 
bargaining positions” (Fung 2005, 415). With this in mind, the proposed CA 
outlined in this book has been designed specifically to minimize resistance to 
the idea across the ideological spectrum, in order to earn more support for it. 
Even with this design, though, some politicians will want nothing to do with 
a CA – even one restricted to advising the government – because it might 
prove to be a nuisance, an infringement on their apparently inalienable right 
to monopolize the discourse on public policy.
There is almost no direct supplement to representative democracy in Can-
ada, or in any other nation, for that matter. The “reasons for that are political 
rather than practical or technical: those who occupy positions of power and 
authority simply do not want it, and actively resist any attempt to bring it 
into being. Opposition to democracy is not as moribund as public rhetoric 
might lead us to suppose” (Arblaster 1994, 86). No country has a permanent 
institution of governance like the one recommended in this study. This isn’t 
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because a CA is difficult to organize or is unaffordable – it is neither – but 
rather because it threatens the status of elites, especially politicians and lead-
ing civil servants, forcing them to share governance with their fellow citizens.
Opposition to a permanent CA can come even from surprising quarters. 
For instance, at the end of their multi-assembly study, Fournier et al. (2011, 
155) declare that a CA “is an expensive instrument that ought to be used 
sparingly, and under exceptional circumstances,” and “only when there is 
a relatively large consensus that there is a real ‘problem’.” It should be, in 
effect, “a ‘last resort’ instrument that has the potential to improve the way we 
address some of our most pressing conundrums.”
In contrast, I suggest we have much to gain from having a permanent 
assembly, and we can suffer great losses by not having one. A CA would 
inaugurate a continual dialogue between the people and their legislators. 
It would serve as a source of policy ideas for the nation and, perhaps more 
fundamentally, a vocal and effective lobbyist for the citizenry. An assembly 
would constitute one of a number of “inputs” into the policymaking process, 
though one that would yield advice of exceptional quality. It would be a mir-
ror of society, enabling us, for the first time in history, to see what we truly 
look like. It would ensure that no interest group could ever again claim to be 
speaking for the “silent majority”; the fact that the perspective of a collec-
tion of advocates for any cause is or is not reflective of the views of most 
people would soon be made clear to everyone. A CA could also change our 
political culture for the better, allowing citizens to take some ownership of 
decisions – in the high number of cases when Parliament would concur with 
the assembly – instead of laying blame on “those damned politicians,” and 
thus help to attenuate the current mentality of “us vs. them,” of “the people 
vs. the politicos.”
A CA would also be a mechanism to ensure that elites do not get out of 
control, a way of reducing the distance between those who are representatives 
and those who are represented, by creating a bridge between the two. It would 
also be a way of reducing the time necessary to reach a point of accountabil-
ity, from possibly years by virtue of elections, to a few months via assembly 
reports, which would give governments swift and comprehensive feedback. 
Furthermore, a CA would supplement what we do with our vote on election 
day, when we send out a general message on which broad menu of policy 
options we prefer. With a CA, we could also give specific guidance to Parlia-
ment, and do so one policy issue at a time.
CAs had their origins in ancient Athens, where all attendees had a right 
to speak. While it would be almost impossible to replicate that model in our 
politics today, a modern CA, giving all members of a representative sample 
the ability to express their views, would allow us to produce something won-
derfully close to a carbon-copy of the Athenian ideal. It would enable us to 
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mine the knowledge-base of our modern demos in a manner that makes effi-
cient use of time, effort, and money. In the process, this new institution could 
produce a significant cultural change as well, given that at Athens, the law-
givers and the jury panels, selected by lottery, “were taken to be (not merely 
to represent) the Athenian people” (Cartledge 2016, 21). With the passage of 
time, citizens might look to their assemblies and conclude, for instance, that 
they don’t just represent Canadians; rather, they are Canadians (or “they are 
Canada”). This would mean that the people’s voice, while ultimately not hav-
ing final authority (which would be reserved for Parliament), would become 
more prominent, more influential, and more respected than at any point in the 
nation’s history.
So let’s be innovative! The world will not spin off its axis if assemblies 
are created. The worst thing that could happen is that after ten years, when 
the experiment could be ended, there would exist a shelf full of careful, intel-
ligent commentaries on dozens of matters of concern to the public at large. To 
the inevitable retort: “That would cost Canadians $800 million,” my response 
is: “What have the people obtained from the Senate in the last eight years for 
roughly the same amount? And what is the potential price tag that comes with 
not having an assembly?”
Which polity will serve as the impetus for a CA? In Canada, the federal 
government could create a CA, but one might also have its origins in the 
provinces, the territories, or the municipalities. It is the country’s sub-national 
governments that have often made policy advancements first, for instance 
Saskatchewan on Medicare and Quebec on child care. Any province, or 
even a city, could show leadership in the development of a CA and serve as 
an incubator for CAs throughout the country. It could also be the case that 
Ireland, Scotland, Australia, or one of the progressive Scandinavian or Latin 
American countries will be the first to make this innovative reform to their 
democracies. One thing is for certain. We are moving into a new era, one 
where citizens across the globe, in various ways, are demanding transfor-
mations, not just to government policies but also to the methods of gover-
nance themselves. Some people, somewhere, will choose to lead democratic 
reforms, serving as an inspiration to the rest of the world. Only time will tell 
us who those people are.
NOTE
 1. With a citizens’ assembly, some of these consultations would no longer be 
required, hence lowering slightly the previously estimated cost of my proposed CA.
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